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From the Great Wall of China to the Berlin Wall, border walls have long 
served as symbols of visible, fortified manifestations of sovereign control. 
Increasingly, however, prosperous countries utilize sophisticated legal tools to 
restrict mobility by detaching the border and its migration control functions from 
a fixed territorial marker, creating a new framework: the shifting border. This 
shifting border, unlike a reinforced physical barrier, is not fixed in time and place. 
It relies on law’s admission gates rather than a specific frontier location. The 
remarkable development of recent years is that the border itself has become a 
moving barrier, an unmoored legal construct. These dramatic transformations 
unsettle ideas about waning sovereignty just as they illustrate the limits of the 
push toward border-fortification. By charting the logic of a new cartography of 
borders and membership boundaries, Professor Shachar shows both the 
tremendous creativity and risk attached to these new legal innovations and the 
public powers they invigorate and propagate. This Article further demonstrates 
that debates about migration and globalization can no longer revolve around the 
dichotomy between open versus closed borders. As an alternative to these 
established theoretical poles and as part of a broader attempt to overcome policy 
deadlocks at the domestic and international level, Professor Shachar proposes a 
new approach to human mobility and access to membership in a world marred by 
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“It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by 
students of international [law and] politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at 
the ground that one is walking on.”1 
 
“[A] border for immigration purposes [is defined] as any point at which the identity 
of the traveler can be verified…[viewing] the border not as a geographical line but 
rather as a continuum of checkpoints along a route of travel from the country of 
origin to [destination].”2 
INTRODUCTION  
From Donald Trump’s campaign promise to build an “impenetrable, 
physical, tall, powerful, beautiful southern border wall,”3 to the brisk construction 
of barbed-wire fences by European countries as diverse as Austria, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, France, Hungary, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Slovenia in 
response to the refugee crisis,4 border walls and razor fences signal that even in a 
supposed post-Westphalian era, physical barriers are still considered powerful 
measures to regulate migration and movement.5 
Instead of becoming relics of a bygone era, as many had predicted after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, border walls have become visible, fortified manifestations 
of (real or imagined) sovereign control.6 As important as these walled borders are, 
 
1 John G Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 
INT’L ORG. 139, 174 (1993). 
2 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF CAN., REPORT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA TO THE 
HOUSE OF COMMONS CH. 5, at 8 (2003); see also CAN. BORDER SERVS. AGENCY, DEPARTMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE REPORT 2008–09 § 2 (2009);  Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information 
Sharing Among the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and The U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS), Preamble, 
Feb. 19, 2003 , https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/statement-
mutual-understanding-information-sharing/statement.html [hereinafter SMU]. 
3 Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigration-speech.html. 
4 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Border Fences and Internal Border Controls in 
Europe (Mar. 2017), https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/55249. 
5 For a critical exploration of border walls, see WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING 
SOVEREIGNTY (2010). See also Moria Paz, The Law of Walls, 28 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 601 (2017). 
6 Definitions of sovereignty may vary, but legally there are three enduring constituent features: people, 
territory, and political authority exercised over that territory and its people. As Robert Jackson 
observes, “[s]overeignty is an idea of authority embodied in those bordered territorial organizations 
we refer to as ‘States’.”  ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA, at ix, 1 
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both symbolically and practically, this Article highlights an equally striking yet 
under-studied trend: the surge of invisible borders—borders that rely on 
sophisticated legal techniques that detach migration control functions from a fixed 
territorial marker.  
One might reasonably expect that the regulation of access to the territorial 
state would automatically correspond with its recognized physical and 
cartographic frontiers. In contrast with the fixed lines we find in our maps and law 
books, however, the location of the border is shifting when it comes to migration 
control: at times the border penetrates into the interior, while in other 
circumstances it extends beyond the edge of the territory. In other contexts, fixed 
territorial borders are “erased” or refortified. This reinvention of the border is 
occurring in the midst of growing political anxiety over immigration and 
“uncontrolled” entry.7 The fixed black lines we see in our world atlases do not 
always coincide with those comprehended in—indeed, created by—the words of 
law. Increasingly, prosperous countries utilize sophisticated legal tools to 
selectively restrict—or, conversely, accelerate—mobility by detaching the border 
and its migration control functions from a fixed territorial marker, creating a new 
framework that I call the shifting border. 
This shifting border, unlike a reinforced physical barrier, is not fixed in time 
and place. It relies on law’s admission gates rather than a specific frontier location. 
The remarkable development of recent years is that the border itself has become 
a moving barrier, an unmoored legal construct. This is part of a shifting-border 
strategy that strives, as official government policy documents plainly and tellingly 
explain, to “‘push the border out’ as far away from the actual [territorial] border 
as possible.”8 The idea, enthusiastically endorsed by governments in relatively 
rich and stable regions of the world, is to screen people at the source or origin of 
 
(2007). In international law, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the 
State, echoes the traditional Westphalian view, stating that: “The State as a person of international law 
should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relation with other States.” Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of the State (Montevideo Convention) art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. In international 
politics, the centrality of territory to sovereignty is acknowledged as a basic norm of the Westphalian 
order. See Michael Zürn et al., International Authority and its Politicization, 4 INT’L THEORY 69 
(2012). 
7 My focus throughout the discussion is on the formal, legal aspect of crossing international borders. 
The terms “unauthorized,” “undocumented,” and “irregular migration” are used interchangeably. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as “[m]ovement that takes 
place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or 
universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries 
irregularity requires entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents 
required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity 
is seen for example in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid 
passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the 
country.” INT’L ORG. MIGRATION, KEY MIGRATION TERMS, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-
terms. 
8 GOV’T OF CANADA, CUSTOMS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT, BORDER MANAGEMENT IN CANADA 
(2018), https://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/border-
douanes.aspx?lang=eng. 
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their journey (rather than at their destination country) and then again at every 
possible “checkpoint along the travel continuum—visa screening; airport check-
in; points of embarkation; transit points; international airports and seaports.”9 The 
traditional static border is thus reimagined as the last point of encounter, rather 
than the first.10  
Just as the shifting border extends the long arm of the state to regulate 
mobility half the world away, it also stretches deep into the interior, creating 
within liberal democracies what have been referred to as “waiting zones” or 
“constitution lite zones.”11 In these zones, ordinary constitutional rights are 
partially suspended or limited, especially for those who do not have proper 
documentation or the necessary legal status to remain in the country.12 Each of 
these spatial and temporal contractions and protrusions has dramatic implications 
for the scope of rights and protections that migrants and other non-citizens enjoy, 
and contribute to a global mobility divide between the haves and have-nots.13 As 
migration pressures mount, governments in rich countries frantically search for 
new ways to expand the reach of their remit, both conceptually and operationally, 
inwards and outwards, while in the process reinventing one of the classic 
dimensions of sovereignty in the modern era: territoriality.  
Under the Westphalian lens and lexis, the modern state is a territorial state. 
Territoriality, or the territorial principle—understood here as the proposition that 
a legitimate government has ultimate authority over a defined territory and its 
population—is a central feature of the classical understanding of the current 
 
9 SMU, supra note 2. 
10 My reference here is to the current legal situation which holds, in the words of the European Court 
of Human Rights, that “[s]tates enjoy an ‘undeniable sovereign right to control aliens’ entry into and 
residence in their territory.” Saadi v. UK, App. No. 13229/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 64 (2008) (internal 
references omitted).  
11 See United States v. Gabriel, 405 F. Supp. 2d 50, 59 (D. Me. 2005) (noting the constitutional 
implications of “pushing the border in”). In the United States, Customs and Border Patrol agents are 
invested with the statutory authority to stop and conduct searches on vessels, trains, aircraft, or other 
vehicles within “a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States” for purposes 
of “preventing the illegal entry of aliens into the U.S.” Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 CFR § 
287(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2012). See CHRIS RICKERD, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CUSTOMS 
AND BORDER PROTECTION’S (CBP’S) 100-MILE RULE, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/14_9_15_cbp_100-mile_rule_final.pdf. This 
“reasonable distance” is defined through regulation as “100 air miles,” although a distance of more 
than 100 miles may also be considered reasonable due to unusual circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 
287.1(b), https://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/fedreg/fr022/fr022236/fr022236.pdf. 
12 Legal status here refers to a right to enter or remain in the country. See Hiroshi Motomura, Haitian 
Asylum Seekers: Interdiction and Immigrants’ Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 695, 696 (1993) 
(discussing the concept of the “functional equivalent of the ... border”). In the European context, these 
have been referred to as “waiting zones” (zones d’Attente). For a concise overview, see Tugba Basaran, 
Legal Borders in Europe: The Waiting Zone, in A THREAT AGAINST EUROPE: SECURITY, MIGRATION 
AND INTEGRATION (Peter Burgess & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2001).  
13 Steffen Mau et al., The Global Mobility Divide: How Visa Policies Have Evolved over Time, 8 J. 
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1192 (2015); see Ayelet Shachar, Citizenship for Sale?, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP 789 (Ayelet Shachar et al. eds., 2017) (discussing the unequal value of 
passports). 
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international world order.14 On this familiar and naturalized account, the territorial 
principle plays a key role in constituting respect for international borders and 
justifying their operation to demarcate “places, territories, and categories,”15 
thereby producing a cartographic image of the world as a “jigsaw puzzle of solid 
colour pieces fitting neatly together.”16 Borders, according to this perspective, are 
the black lines we draw in our maps to divide up the world, with dramatic 
ramifications for the scope of rights and protections offered to individuals, 
depending on where said individuals stand in relation to these divvying lines. This 
process distinguishes between member and non-member, insider and outsider, 
and the interior and the exterior. Only citizens have a guaranteed right to enter 
and remain within the jurisdiction of the territorial state; all others (with the 
exception of those seeking refuge and asylum) require permission to gain such 
access. For the bulk of humanity, then, gaining lawful admission to desired 
destination countries remains “a privilege granted by the sovereign.”17 This makes 
control of the border the liminal and legal linchpin of migration regulation.  
 In a world where borders are transforming, but not dissolving, I aim to 
show that the question of legal spatiality—where a person is barred from onward 
mobility, and by whom—has dramatic consequences for the rights and protections 
of those on the move, as well as the correlating duties and responsibilities of the 
countries they seek to reach and the transit locations they pass through. Here lies 
the deep paradox of the shifting border: when it comes to controlling migration, 
States are willfully abandoning traditional notions of fixed and bounded 
territoriality, stretching their jurisdictional arm inward and outward with 
tremendous flexibility; but when it comes to granting rights and protections, the 
very same States snap back to a narrow and strict interpretation of spatiality, 
which limits their responsibility and liability by attaching it to the (illusionary) 
static notion of border control. This duality is perhaps most profoundly 
pronounced in the case of asylum seekers who trigger protection obligations only 
once they reach the destination country’s soil, even as access to these territorial 
spaces of protection is increasingly unavailable. States shut those on the move out 
long before they reach the gates of the promised lands of migration and asylum.18  
By charting the logic of a new cartography—a legal reconstruction—of 
borders and membership boundaries I seek to show both the tremendous creativity 
 
14 For an illuminating conceptual and historical overview, see Matej Avbelj, Theorizing Sovereignty 
and European Integration, 27 RATIO JURIS 344 (2014). See also Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar, 
Spatial Statism, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1 (2019).  
15 ALEXANDER C. DINER & JOSHUA HAGAN, BORDERS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 1 (2012). 
16 Karen Knop, Statehood: Territory, People, Government, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds., 2012). 
17 This is the classical formulation articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of United 
States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 228 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). In rule-of-law societies, which are 
the subject of inquiry here, such determinations are made by authorized officials based on rules, 
regulations, and provisions stipulated in domestic and international law. 
18 See, e.g., Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Refugee, the Sovereign, and the Sea: EU Interdiction 
Policies in the Mediterranean, in SOVEREIGNTY GAMES: INSTRUMENTALIZING STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
IN EUROPE AND BEYOND 171 (Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen eds., 2008). 
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and risk attached to these new legal innovations and the yet-to-be regulated 
governmental powers they invigorate and propagate. I further aim to establish that 
debates about migration and globalization can no longer revolve around the 
dichotomy between open versus closed borders. Instead, the unique and 
perplexing feature of this new landscape is that countries simultaneously engage 
in both opening and closing their borders, but do so selectively. Countries indicate, 
quite decisively, whom they desire to admit (those with specialized skills, superb 
talents, or increasingly, deep pockets), while at the same time erecting higher and 
higher legal walls to block out those deemed unwanted or too different.19  
This dialectical relationship between restrictive closure and selective 
openness is what makes the study of the new legal gates of admission ever more 
vital. This relationship is also where the reformulation of basic conceptions of 
membership boundaries intertwine with profound questions of justice and 
distribution about how, by whom, and according to what principles, well-off 
societies should allocate access to safety and protection in an unequal world like 
our own. It further reveals, quite vividly, the recalibration of new immigration and 
border regimes as “public statements,” as a recent study put it, “about who we are 
now, who we want to become, and who is morally worthy to join us.”20  
The shifting border is a key pillar in prosperous countries’ wholesale agenda 
to strategically and selectively sort and regulate mobility. As a result, it is 
increasingly difficult for unwanted and uninvited migrants to set foot in the 
greener pastures of the more affluent and stable polities they desperately seek to 
enter. Conversely, wealthy migrants wishing to deposit their mobile capital in 
these very same countries find fewer and fewer restrictions to fast-tracked 
admission.21 Increasingly, the world’s most prosperous and stable democracies 
rely on the shifting border concept and practice to (re)ascribe meaning to borders 
and gatekeeping far beyond the traditionally fixed sovereignty-territory nexus, 
making borders “semi-permeable to some and inescapable for others.”22  
To substantiate these claims, my discussion proceeds in three parts. Part I 
begins by painting a picture of the complex, multilayered, and ever-transforming 
border, one that is drawn and redrawn through the law. To comprehend the 
novelty of the shifting border, I contrast competing models: the classic, clearly 
demarcated territorial border that serves as the frontline for setting barriers to 
 
19 Ayelet Shachar, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for Talent, 120 YALE 
L.J. 2088 (2011); Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, On Citizenship, States and Markets, 22 J. POL. PHIL. 
231 (2014); Ayelet Shachar, Selecting by Merit: The Brave New World of Stratified Mobility, in 
MIGRATION IN POLITICAL THEORY: THE ETHICS OF MOVEMENT AND MEMBERSHIP (Sarah Fine & Lea 
Ypi eds., 2016).  
20 David Cook-Martin & David FitzGerald, Culling the Masses: A Rejoinder, 38 J. ETHNIC & RACIAL 
STUD. 1319, 1320 (2015); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2021 (1996).  
21 Shachar, supra note 13 at 794. 
22 As Frontex, the European border agency, has explicitly put it, these measures are designed to curb 
the flow of “the billions of less fortunate people of the world.” See JAMES FERGUSSON, TWELVE 
SECONDS TO DECIDE: IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE, FRONTEX AND THE PRINCIPLE OF BEST PRACTICE 
8 (2014). 
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admission, which I call the static model and the alternate, globalist vision of a 
world in which extant borders are, or soon will be, traversed with the greatest of 
ease, to the extent that they become all but meaningless. This we might label the 
disappearing border. The latter has led some scholars to claim that the grip of 
borders, or even the fundamental principle of territoriality itself, is waning in a 
world “where agency (individual choice) takes precedence over structure (the 
laws and rules of territorial States).”23 As a corollary, some argue that in the 
current age of globalization, States are losing control over their authority to 
determine whom to include and whom to exclude.24 The actual legal practices of 
and exercise of authority by governments operating under the shifting border 
framework, alas, refute this narrative of global, unidirectional progression toward 
a borderless world. Instead, we witness a more dynamic process of change 
whereby States—acting alone or in concert—are reinventing and reinvigorating 
their borders and membership boundaries in profound ways.25 By understanding 
the shifting border as an alternative to the established theoretical poles of static 
and disappearing boundaries, I aim to show that the proposed framework of 
analysis more fully captures and accounts for the profound patterns of change that 
we are witnessing in the world around us.  
Part II focuses on the legal innovations adopted by the world’s leading 
immigrant-receiving countries spearheading the shifting border paradigm: the 
United States, Canada, and Australia. I also demonstrate how the European Union 
and its member States have rewritten pages—if not chapters—of the shifting 
border book. These case studies provide a rich empirical foundation upon which 
the rest of the discussion relies.  
Part III moves from the positive to the normative to the prescriptive. It 
articulates the contours of a new approach that seeks to realign the almost 
boundless reach of migration control in the age of shifting borders with some 
degree of accountability, legal responsibility, and adherence to important 
constitutional limitations and human rights norms by state actors or their 
delegates, public and private. I argue that in order to effectively constrain the 
excesses of the shifting border, jurists and activists must adapt to its perplexing 
“everywhere-and-nowhere” logic. One promising way to respond to the multiple, 
 
23 James F. Hollifield, Sovereignty and Migration, IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM FROM 1900 TO THE 
PRESENT 575 (Matthew J. Gibney & Randall Hansen eds., 2005).  
24 See YASMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL 
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994) (defending the post-national claim that universal personhood has 
surpassed the significance of national belonging); DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: 
IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP (1996) (same). More critical accounts have 
emphasized the themes of immobilization, entrapment, the tightening of entry controls and the 
emergence of a “paradigm of suspicion.” The term, “paradigm of suspicion,” is from Ronen Shamir, 
Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime, 23 SOC. THEORY 197, 197 (2005).  
25 While in some cases operating unilaterally, States are also devising increasingly complex and 
multilayered mobility control regimes that require extensive interstate cooperation. See, e.g., 
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the European Community on the Processing of 
Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Data, Mar. 21, 2006, 49 O.J. L82, 
http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105046. 
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mobile and diffuse features of the shifting border is to apply the presumption that 
“when legal power is brought to bear, so too are legal protections.”26 This 
presumption adheres to basic rule of law principles holding that “the political 
branches … [cannot] govern without legal constraints.”27 When a country such as 
the “United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and 
unlimited.’”28 Basic rights protections are not “turned on or off at will.”29 Instead 
of focusing on where the act of border regulation took place, the proposed 
approach requires adopting a functional or jurisdictional test according to which 
obligations to protect are activated as soon as effective control by official agents 
of States, or their delegates, occurs.30 The idea is to treat the everywhere-and-
nowhere logic of the shifting border as a new feature of governance which invites 
innovation to tame the most excessive and yet-unregulated exercise of de-
territorialized migration and border control. I will argue that by applying familiar 
principles to novel circumstances, the restless agility and multiscalar operations 
of the shifting border may elicit a set of rights-enhancing protections from the 
restricting States, which hitherto have relied on this new technology of 
governance and spatiality to escape accountability and constrain rights. This line 
of response incorporates the very logic of de-territorialized migration control that 
lies at the heart of the shifting border, while at the same time subverting it, and 
relies on three prongs: (i) expanding the extraterritorial reach of human rights; (ii) 
requiring states to extend their shifting borders in favor of mobility, rather than to 
limit it; and (iii) rethinking legal spatiality as a resource, rather than a barrier, for 
migrants in need of protection. While this three-pronged approach is not a 
panacea, the endeavor is to break the current deadlock and refute the claim that 
applicable solutions are beyond reach or impossible to imagine. 
I. 
THE SHIFTING BORDER 
To comprehend the novelty of the shifting border, we must contrast it with 
contending models: the classic, clearly demarcated territorial border that serves 
 
26 Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2503, 2504 (2005). This 
presumption is rebuttable, as Raustiala rightly points out. Indeed, some of the most lasting debates 
center around defining the precise geographical reach of this presumption. For an excellent overview 
of these debates, see Shown E. Fields, From Guantánamo to Syria: The Extraterritorial Constitution 
in the Age of ‘Extreme Vetting,’ 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1123, 1129–41 (2018).  
27 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text. This position is shared by many human rights 
organizations and is also the theory that guided the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the 
landmark decision of Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012). See 
generally, EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES (Bernard Ryan & 
Valsamis Mitsilegas, eds., 2010).  For an early defense of the position that “[n]arrow territorial 
interpretation of human rights treaties is anathema to the basic idea of human rights, which is to ensure 
that a State should respect human rights of persons over whom it exercises jurisdiction,” see Theodor 
Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 82 (1995).  
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as the frontline for setting barriers to admission and the contrasting, globalist 
vision of a world in which extant borders are traversed with the greatest of ease, 
to the extent that they become all but meaningless. It is convenient to refer to these 
competing approaches as the static versus disappearing conceptions of the border. 
I discuss each in turn. 
A. Neither Static Nor Disappearing 
The classic Westphalian ideal of statehood sees the border as a permanent 
and static barrier that stands at the frontier of a country’s territory. This formidable 
border serves a crucial role in delimiting (externally) and binding (internally) a 
nation’s territory, jurisdiction, and peoplehood, correlating with a notion of fixed 
“legal spatiality.”31 For many years, this concept permeated our thinking about 
mobility, borders, and sovereignty, ensnaring us in what political geographers 
refer to as the “territorial trap.”32 This trap, and the assumption undergirding it, 
reifies and naturalizes the lines demarcating States as though they represent 
bounded, mutually exclusive territorial units. By envisioning States as having a 
monopoly over the legitimate exercise of power and authority within their 
domains, the territoriality principle politicizes space and brings it under juridical 
control.  
With the rise of the discourse of globalization, a competing vision emerged. 
The thought de jour was that borders are, or soon will be, disappearing. Theorists 
of post-nationalism, trans-nationalism and open-border admission policies have 
painted a picture of a new world order in which borders are on the decline, global 
commerce and human mobility is on the rise, and international human rights 
instruments gain sway. Catchphrases such as the “end of the nation-state,” 
“waning sovereignty,” and a “borderless world” have gained traction. In the post-
Westphalian literature of the last quarter century, the core prognosis is that borders 
are becoming things of the past, sovereignty is diminishing, and States as 
territorially-bounded “containers” of authority are dissipating.  
These predictions are now contested. From the surge of nationalist populism 
to the backlash against supranational courts and challenges to the multilateral 
architecture of the post-war international order, reports of the demise of States 
and borders appear to have been, like the rumors of Mark Twain’s death, greatly 
exaggerated. Whereas adherents to the disappearing border thesis have claimed 
that States can no longer restrict access by non-citizens seeking to enter, an 
opposite trend has appeared. By severing the link between the territorial border 
and the exercise of migration control, the shifting border has given governments 
and regulatory agencies (operating primarily but not only at the national level) 
greater latitude to develop new enforcement policies that manipulate the location 
and spatial reach of the border—seeping into the territory’s interior or extending 
 
31 Raustiala, supra note 26; see also John H. Herz, Rise and Demise of the Territorial State, 9 WORLD 
POL. 473, 480–481 (1957). 
32 John Agnew, The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations 
Theory, 9 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 53 (1994).  
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well beyond its outer limits—in the process deterring access by uninvited 
migrants.  
B. The Sites of Regulation: “At the Border” 
Given the close connection between sovereign authority, territory, and legal 
spatiality, the Westphalian model logically assumed that it is precisely at the 
border that agents of the State are permitted to exercise the utmost control over 
access, including through the power to make the decision “to turn back from our 
gates any alien or class of aliens.”33 The core precedents in the corpus of American 
immigration law repeat the observation that an alien who is stopped at the border 
enjoys far less protection than a person who is already within the country.34 Such 
rights remain unavailable to would-be immigrants, so long as they remain outside 
the geographical borders of the United States.35 The notion that legal 
circumstances affecting non-members substantively change after they cross “our 
gates” manifests a vision of a world order characterized by hermetically sealed 
legal spatiality alongside delineated and permanent borders. However, these 
assumptions are increasingly strained. While continuing to formally rely on the 
fixed conception of a border with rigid binary distinctions between the exterior 
and the interior, regulatory agencies and actors situated at multiple levels and 
junctures of governance simultaneously expand the actual (largely unchecked) 
scope and reach of their migration and border control activities far beyond the 
edges of the territory and deep into the interior. 
Relaxing the relationship between law and territoriality has created a whole 
new purview for exercising sovereign control over migration anywhere in the 
world in the name of securing the integrity of the home territory and vigilantly 
protecting its membership boundaries. This new interpretation profoundly 
challenges the classic Westphalian conceptualization of the border as static and 
fixed. Instead, the shifting border resourcefully turns the border, which was once 
territorially affixed to the edge of a country’s geopolitical frontier, into a moving 
barrier. As such, it can be “implanted” wherever and whenever mobility control 
operations are required. While retaining the foundational notions of inclusion and 
exclusion, the shifting border fractalizes them such that they can be reoriented 
across time and space distally remote from the actual protected homeland, 
relocating the encounter between the non-citizen and the state’s power of 
exclusion away from the physical border toward the outermost concentric ring of 
regulation that is closest to the departure point and time. These dramatic measures 
also blur and erode the once-firm distinction between the full-fledged rights-
holding citizen and the less-welcome alien.  
As both scholars and law enforcement agencies are quick to observe, States 
have the capacity and the authority to “determine those to admit and to whom 
 
33 Shaughnessy, 228 U.S. at 550 (Jackson J., dissenting).  
34 This dates back to the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925).  
35 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990). 
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citizenship should be granted.”36 Under the static image of the Westphalian 
international system, each state has its own clearly-demarcated and exclusive 
territory and citizenry. The legal drawing of borders and membership 
boundaries—and the consequent authority to control who enters the territory—is 
seen as a sine qua non of sovereignty.37 However, the flexible way in which these 
traditional concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction are now put into operation are 
novel, leading to pressing and yet unresolved tensions between these new 
measures of controlling mobility across (ever-shifting) borders and rule-of-law 
countries’ declared commitments to constitutional and human rights standards 
and protections. These tensions reveal the inadequacy of seeking (or creating) 
legal cover under the static conception of the border while persistently breaching 
it through the devising of far more dynamic, multifaceted, and de-territorialized 
techniques of governance that rely on the shifting border. I now turn to chart the 
surprisingly sophisticated and imaginative “re-bordering” techniques that enable 
the far-reaching reinvention of the border as simultaneously more open and 
closed. 
II. 
DOMESTIC AND COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES 
Ongoing developments in the regulation of immigration around the world 
demonstrate a complex shift in the way modern states implement and situate 
border controls. Consider the following examples, from near and far.38  
A. Seeping Inward 
As part of a major reform to border control and immigration regulation, the 
United States adopted a procedure called “expedited removal.”39 This legal 
 
36 Myron Weiner, Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control of Immigration, 30 INT’L MIGRATION 
REV. 171, 171 (1996); see ANNE T. GALLAGHER & FIONA DAVID, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
MIGRANT SMUGGLING 2 (2014) (discussing the international legal framework against migrant 
smuggling).  
37 This sentiment is perhaps best captured by Emmerich de Vattel’s milestone mid-eighteenth century 
international law treatise, THE LAW OF NATIONS. Fast forwarding to the early twenty-first century, 
however, we find that many of the most heated debates in legal and political theory today reexamine 
this, once taken for granted, authority of States to exclusively control their membership boundaries 
and to unilaterally control the borders of entry and admission, or put more bluntly, their right to 
exclude. See, e.g., Arash Abizadah, Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to 
Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders, 36 Pᴏʟ. Tʜᴇᴏʀʏ 37 (2008). For a contrasting view, see 
Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration and Freedom of Association, 119 Eᴛʜɪᴄꜱ 109 (2008). While 
these theoretical debates are illuminating and potentially path-breaking, they often lack the kind of 
minute detail and sensitivity to context offered by legal or sociological analysis. 
38 These examples are elucidatory and cumulative rather than exhaustive. 
39 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) § 302 (revised § 
235(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 2017) (“If an immigration officer 
determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the 
United States or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), the 
officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless 
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provision permits frontline officers and border patrol agents to expeditiously turn 
away undocumented migrants at the border and review the legal status of 
individuals detected up to one hundred miles away from any external boundary of 
the United States.40 In effect, expedited removal has moved the border from its 
fixed location at the country’s territorial edges and into the interior.  
This legal maneuver not only relocates the border, but also augments what 
has been referred to as a “constitution-free” or “constitution-lite” zone within the 
United States—allowing law enforcement agents to set up checkpoints on 
highways, at ferry terminals, or on trains, requiring any random person to provide 
proof of their legal status in the United States.41 Such governmental surveillance 
of movement and mobility—traditionally restricted to the actual location of 
border crossing—is now spilling into the interior. This trend is depicted in Figure 
1: United States: The Shifting Border—Seeping into the Interior, located in the 
Appendix. 
The most recent official US census data reveal that no less than two-thirds 
of the United States population lives in this one hundred-mile constitution-lite 
zone.42 That is, more than 200 million people live in the malleable or moveable 
border zone.43 The whole State of New York, for example, lies completely within 
one hundred miles of the land and coastal borders of the United States.44 So does 
Florida, another migrant-magnet State.45 And the governmental agency 
responsible for managing the shifting border, the Department of Homeland 
Security, has gone on record declaring that its border-enforcement measures may 
well expand “nationwide.”46  
 
the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 208 or a fear of persecution.”). 
40 The current temporal and spatial specifications of expedited removal appear in the Federal Register. 
In 2002, expedited removal was extended to all those who had entered the United States without 
authorization by water and could not establish to the satisfaction of a border agent that they had been 
continuously present in the country for at least two years. Cuban nationals were originally exempted 
from this class. However, that exemption was rescinded on January 17, 2017. In 2004, the reach of 
expedited removal was expanded to include aliens apprehended within one hundred miles of a US 
international border within fourteen days of entry. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 
Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004). 
41 The US Supreme Court has held that such internal checkpoints on highways leading to or away from 
the border are not a violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and the border patrol agents “have wide discretion” to selectively refer motorists for 
additional questioning. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564 (1976). Such 
checkpoints are “located on major U.S highways and secondary roads, usually 25 to 100 miles inland 
from the border.” See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-824, BORDER PATROL: 
CHECKPOINTS CONTRIBUTE TO BORDER PATROL’S MISSION, BUT MORE CONSISTENT DATA 
COLLECTION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT COULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 7 (2009). People 
who enter the United States without permission and are apprehended within one hundred miles of a 
US international border within fourteen days of entry are subject to expedited removal. See 
Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004). 
42 Rickerd, supra note 11. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative 1 (Nov. 2, 2005) 
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Until recently, the prospect of nationwide implementation seemed to belong 
squarely in the realm of the futuristic and the implausible. However, in today’s 
political environment of “getting tough” on immigration, the current 
administration’s commitment to “using all these statutory authorities to the 
greatest extent practicable”47 potentially translates into a massive spatial and 
temporal expansion of expedited removal.48 Supplemented by multiple executive 
orders and accompanying memos, expedited removal could potentially reach “any 
immigrant anywhere in the United States who can’t prove that they’ve been in the 
country for two or more years.”49 A simple notice in the Federal Register is all 
that is required to make this sweeping augmentation of the border a legal reality. 
Under the shifting border paradigm, the “interior” could be recast as the “exterior” 
for the purposes of immigration control with the stroke of a pen.50 
 
(emphasis added). 
47 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, et al. on Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve 
the National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-
Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf. 
48 On January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13767 (“Border Security and 
Immigration Enforcement Improvements”) and Executive Order 13768 (“Enhancing Public Safety in 
the Interior of the United States”) which cumulatively hold the potential to dramatically expand the 
reach of expedited removal. Subsequently, then-DHS Secretary John Kelly issued two memos on the 
implementation of the aforementioned executive orders. Read together, the memos committed to using 
all “statutory authorities to the greatest extent practicable” and promised a new Notice Designating 
Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal to be published in the Federal Register. Memorandum from John 
Kelly, supra note 47; Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, et al. on Implementing the 
President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies (Feb. 20 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-
Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf. Based on the language of the 
executive orders and memos, some observers have concluded the Secretary intends to utilize his 
discretion to the fullest extent authorized, both spatially (nationwide) and temporally (two years). E.g., 
INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) ((I) The Attorney General may apply clauses 
(i) and (ii) of this subparagraph to any or all aliens described in subclause (II) as designated by the 
Attorney General. Such designation shall be in the sole and unreviewable discretion of the Attorney 
General and may be modified at any time. (II) An alien described in this clause is an alien who is not 
described in subparagraph (F), who has not been admitted or paroled into the United States, and who 
has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been 
physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date 
of the determination of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.). 
49 Parties in Castro and Peralta-Sanchez raised the likelihood of such expansion in their arguments 
(emphasis added). See Castro v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec, 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2017), opinion withdrawn on grant of 
reh'g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir 2017), and on reh'g, 705 F App'x 542 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub 
nom Sanchez v United States, 138 S Ct 702, 199 L. Ed. 2d 575 (2018) [‘Peralto-Sanchez’]. For 
information on an interview with ACLU lawyers for Castro, see Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Immigrant 
Families Aren’t Getting Their Day in Court, THINKPROGRESS (May 20, 2016, 1:09 PM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/immigrant-families-arent-getting-their-day-in-court-f7edc1026c2c/ and for 
information on Peralta-Sanchez, see Bob Egelko, Court Denies Immigrants Right to Attorney in 
Expedited Deportations, SFGATE (Feb. 7, 2017, 4:57 PM) 
http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Court-denies-immigrants-Sright-to-attorney-in-10915296.php.  
50 To date, no such notice has been issued. If such an expansion were to occur, major litigation 
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The notion that legal circumstances affecting non-members change 
dramatically after migrants “passed through our gates” is well-established, as 
canonical case law from Shaugnessy to Zadvydas attests.51 However, in addition 
to conjuring house of mirrors-like stretching and contracting movements, the 
shifting border  distinguishes between physical entry into the country (which does 
not count for immigration purposes) and lawful admission through a recognized 
port-of-entry (which makes one’s presence in the territory permissible, and 
therefore visible, in the eyes of the regulatory state). Accordingly, entry into the 
territory—the material act of crossing the geographical border and physically 
being present within the jurisdiction of the United States—does not equate with 
legally “being here.”52 This change in meaning is formalized in law: “an alien 
present in the United States without being admitted,” to recite the somewhat 
cryptic language of the Immigration and Nationality Act, is treated as though the 
irregular migrant (who is already present in the territory) had never really crossed 
the border into the country.53 This legal fiction bears serious consequences for 
those aliens present in the United States without being admitted. For instance, 
their unlawful admission effectuates the preclusion of status regularization or the 
application of waivers during the removal process, thereby causing them to forfeit 
their prospect of future lawful admission to the United States.54 Moreover, the 
very act of crossing without inspection and permission (the otherwise 
unrecognized presence of the non-citizen in the territory) becomes the “main 
substantive charge used to remove them.”55 
Another such ramification is that those on the “inside” are deemed to be 
“outside.” This includes the hundreds of thousands of people expeditiously 
removed each year, who find themselves in a parallel universe of “nonexistent 
procedural safeguards.”56 As a recent court decision put it, for those facing 
expedited removal “[t]here is no right to appear in front of a judge and no right to 
hire legal representation. There is no hearing, no neutral decision-maker, no 
evidentiary findings, and no right to appeal.”57 When such far-reaching denial of 
procedural justice occurs in an established democracy such as the United States, 
 
challenging its constitutionality on due process grounds will likely follow. I thank Alex Aleinikoff and 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales for helpful discussions regarding these various legal scenarios.   
51 Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 693 (2001); see also Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925). 
52 The term “being here” is drawn from Linda Bosniak’s critical investigation into the ethical 
significance of territorial presence of unauthorized migrants. See Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical 
Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 389 (2007); see also Leti 
Volpp, Imaginings of Space in Immigration Law, 9 LAW CULTURE & HUMAN. 456 (2013). 
53 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012). These individuals will have certain constitutional protections 
while in the country, including procedural or substantive due process, or both. 
54 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012). The waivers from removal specified in 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) are easier to establish than those appearing in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i). 
55 There is also a ten-year bar to re-admission. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 
212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)-(II).  
56  United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1143 (2017) (Pregerson, J. dissenting). 
57  Id. at 1142. 
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it tests not only our notions of territoriality, but legality as well. Recent figures 
show that a “staggering 83% of the people removed from the United States . . . 
were [expeditiously] removed without a hearing, without a judge, without legal 
representation, and without the opportunity to apply for most forms of relief from 
removals.”58 The traditional constitutional and human rights arsenal of responses 
has proven toothless in the face of these new realities. To begin to counter this 
phenomenon, we must familiarize ourselves with the shifting legal ground upon 
which this immense, and almost unrestricted, governmental power to determine 
whom to exclude or remove now stands. 
In creating the legal distinction between “entry” and “admission,” US 
immigration law effectively treats individuals present in the country without 
authorization as though they had been stopped at the border, depriving them of 
the traditional protections enjoyed by non-citizens who have actually made it into 
the interior. Such a legal maneuver can only occur by “redrawing the traditional 
exclusion-deportation line” under a shifting conception of the border.59 The 
exclusion-deportation line has become de-territorialized; the key factor for the 
legal analysis is not whether the person has passed through the territory’s physical 
frontiers. Rather, the question for immigration regulation purposes is whether the 
person has crossed at any time or place through the law’s gates of admission, 
which, as the authorizing legislation proclaims, are not territorially fixed but 
rather designated by the executive branch of government.60 
B. Stretching Outward  
Just as the shifting border seeps into the interior, it extends the long arm of 
the state outwards, ever more flexibly, to regulate mobility at a distance. To 
provide but one example, travelers that wish to embark on a US-bound flight now 
regularly encounter the US border, or its authorized guardians (US officials 
located on foreign soil), in places as diverse as Freeport and Nassau in the 
Bahamas, Dublin and Shannon in Ireland, or Abu Dhabi in the United Arab 
Emirates.61 Thanks to a legal carve-out known as the pre-clearance system, these 
 
58 Id. at 1143. The 83 percent figure comes from Department of Homeland Security immigration 
enforcement data for fiscal year 2013 and covers expedited and reinstatement of removal procedures, 
both of which are grounded in the IIRIRA reform and fast-tracked. Id. at 1142–43. 
59 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 
428 (2003). 
60 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 
61 After 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established. It combined the functions 
of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the former US Customs Service. 
Currently, several agencies within DHS perform the duties of border patrol and interior enforcement. 
The US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the largest uniformed federal law enforcement 
agency in the country. CBP agents have the authority to safeguard America’s borders at officially 
designated ports of entry in the United States as well as a growing number of pre-clearance locations 
outside the country. See Preclearance Locations: Preclearance Overview, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION (June 22, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-
entry/operations/preclearance. The US Border Patrol (BP) is part of CBP, which is responsible for 
patrolling the areas at and around the US international borders, namely, the one hundred-mile zone in 
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procedures regularly take place in foreign transit hubs that are sometimes located 
tens, hundreds, or even thousands of miles away from the homeland territory.62  
This reinvention of the border and the kind of legal framework it relies 
upon—allowing the United States to exercise sovereign control over its border, 
far away from its territory, on the home turf of another nation-State—is “a really 
big deal,” explained the former Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security in an interview with The New York Times.63 “[I]t would be like us saying 
you can have a foreign law enforcement operating in a U.S. facility with all the 
privileges given to law enforcement, but we are going to do it on your territory 
and on our rules … So you flip it around, and you realize it is a big deal for 
[another] country to agree to that.”64 Currently, more than 600 American customs 
and border control and agricultural specialists are deployed in airports around the 
world, processing over 18 million US-bound passengers per year before they 
embark on their air travel journeys to the United States. An ambitious expansion 
program for such preclearance and pre-inspection procedures launched in 2015 
with the goal of pre-clearing, on foreign soil, at least a third of all US-bound air 
travelers by 2040. The official publication of America’s border protection agency 
simply and elegantly summarizes the thinking behind this manifestation of the 
shifting border, highlighting its outwards expansion.65 Such expansion is expected 
to promote America’s interests by facilitating international trade and travel, while 
at the same time countering global security threats by allowing the “United States 
and our international partners to jointly identify and address threats at the earliest 
possible point.”66 Such conflation of priority in time with location and distance is 
made possible by and is a manifestation of the shifting border paradigm. 
Strikingly, such pre-inspection decisions bear the full weight of US law as though 
their determinations were made “at the border,” even though the territory of the 
United States is very far from sight. The border has instead been replanted as a 
legal construct on non-US soil.  
While no other country operates its immigration control on American soil, 
the United States has now entered into advanced negotiations to build more 
preclearance capacity at airports overseas, seeking to further expand its reach into 
 
which expedited removal takes places, where BP agents have the jurisdiction to detect, apprehend, 
investigate, and detain “illegal aliens and smugglers of aliens at or near the land [and coastal] border.” 
Lastly, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for locating persons who are 
within the remaining areas of the United States without authorization and removing them where 
relevant. The combined budget of these immigration enforcement agencies is larger than all other 
federal enforcement agencies combined.  
62 Preclearance Locations: Preclearance Overview, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (June 
22, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/operations/preclearance. 
63 Michael S. Schmidt, U.S. Security Expands Presence at Foreign Airports, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/world/europe/us-security-has-beachhead-at-foreign-
airports.html (quoting Janet Napolitano, then Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security). 
64 Id.  
65 Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Releases Fiscal Year 2015 Trade and Travel 
Numbers (March 4, 2016).  
66 Id.  
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new regions and continents.67 The rationale for such expansion is drawn straight 
from the playbook of the shifting border. As the government’s highest officials 
readily pronounce, the intent is to “take every opportunity we have to push our 
[operations] out beyond our borders so that we are not defending the homeland 
from the one-yard line.”68  
Critics, for their part, have decried such developments, arguing that coupled 
with increasingly intrusive reporting and monitoring requirements for 
international travel, the heightened risk of privacy violations reflects a “dystopian 
vision of a ‘transatlantic security space’ involving an exchange of [passenger] 
records, fingerprints and personal data.”69 Despite initial skepticism and concerns 
about compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, key European 
countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom now permit, or are in the process of finalizing, approval for US 
officials to obtain “quasi-operative competences at European airports” so as to 
perform security checks on passengers before embarking on transatlantic flights.70 
Iceland and Italy are the latest countries to have joined this list.71  
Such measures for screening individuals before their arrival at a desired 
destination may well prove to be the wave of the future; they are arguably a 
regulator’s dream tool for deterring unwanted admission. As the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) noted in a recent report, “[m]any States which 
have the ability to do so find that intercepting migrants before they reach their 
territories is one of the most effective measures to enforce their domestic 
immigration laws and policies.”72 This insight has not been lost on the architects 
of the shifting border. The governing legislation in the United States, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, now authorizes US customs and immigration 
protection officers to examine and inspect the passengers and crew of “any 
aircraft, vessel, or train proceeding directly, without stopping, from a port or place 
 
67 In addition to extending migration control aboard for air travel, the United States also has a long 
history of interdiction at sea, which has engendered the controversial US Supreme Court Sale 
precedent, according to which summary return of migrants, including asylum seekers, interdicted on 
the high seas does not engage the non-refoulement obligation to which the United States, like other 
rich democracies, has committed through both its domestic and international law obligations. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 807 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), cert. granted sub nom Sale v. 
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993).  
68 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Office, DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance 
to 10 New Airports (May 29, 2015) (quoting Jen Johnson, then Secretary of Homeland Security); see 
also Ron Dixon, Homeland Security Goes Abroad. Not Everyone is Grateful, N.Y. TIMES, December 
26, 2017 (estimating that over 2,000 Homeland Security employees, including immigration and 
customs enforcement special agents, are now deployed to more than 70 countries around the world).   
69 Philip Oltermann, UK May Allow the U.S. Security Checks on Passengers before Transatlantic 
Travel, GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 2014.  
70 Department of Homeland Security, supra note 68. 
71 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Office, DHS Announces 11 New Airports Selected 
for Possible Preclearance Expansion Following Second Open Season (Nov. 4, 2016).   
72 Human Rights Watch et al., NGO Background Paper on the Refugee and Migration Interface, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 28, 2001), http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/refugees/ngo-
document/ngo_refugee.pdf. 
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in foreign territory to a port-of-entry in the United States” at its point of origin.73 
Such decisions made by US officers stationed at these non-US locations are final 
determinations of admissibility. A fine example is found in the arid, bureaucratic 
words of US immigration law, which hold that inspection made “at the port or 
place in the foreign territory … shall have the same effect under the Act as though 
made at the destined port-of-entry in the United States.”74 This radical “re-
location” of the border—placing it in a foreign territory’s jurisdiction—is made 
possible through a combination of domestic authorization and transnational 
cooperation (typically bilateral agreements with the countries on whose territory 
US agents are permitted to conduct the preclearance). Taking the logic of the 
shifting border a step further, the United States recently signed its first-ever 
regional compact, known as the Memorandum of Cooperation, facilitating 
multilateral border security cooperation in Central America.75 Officials at the 
Department of Homeland Security clarified that such collaboration with national 
governments in transit countries gives the United States room to “stem the flood 
of irregular migration and develop [a] regional approach to addressing the 
ongoing humanitarian and security emergency at our Southern Border.”76  
 The United States’ shifting border is part of a larger transformation to 
which other leading destination countries have contributed through the legislative 
and regulatory actions they have undertaken. The Canadian government, for 
example, proclaims itself a “world leader in developing interdiction strategies 
against illegal migration.”77 Apart from Canada’s massive shared land border with 
the United States, it is otherwise surrounded by large bodies of water and ice. 
Given its geopolitical location, Canada relies heavily on overseas interdiction.78 
Over the years, it has perfected the technique of interdiction abroad, effectively 
relocating much of its migration regulation activities to overseas gateways, 
located primarily in Europe and Asia.79 There, migration integrity officers, or 
liaison officers (as they are called now), conduct border control activities as a 
matter of course even though they are nowhere near the formal edge or frontier of 
Canadian territory. Instead, as a key component of the shifting border strategy, 
these government officials are strategically located in “key foreign embarkation, 
transit and immigration points around the world.”80 As official documents put it, 
 
73 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b) (2019). 
74 Id. 
75 Press Release, U.S Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Nielsen Signs Historic Regional Compact 
with Central America to Stem Irregular Migration at Source, Confront U.S. Border Crisis (March 28, 
2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/03/28/secretary-nielsen-signs-historic-regional-compact-
central-america-stem-irregular 
76 Id.  
77 Janet Dench, Controlling the Borders: C-31 and Interdiction, 19 REFUGE 34, 34–37 (2001).  
78 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, “Evidence” in Standing 
on Guard for Thee: Ensuring that Canada’s Immigration System is Secure, No 021 (14 February 2012) 
(Chair: Mr. David Tilson) at 1-4. 
79 Id. at 3. (Canada has 63 liaison officers in 49 locations around the globe.). 
80 CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, FACT SHEET (2009), https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/media/facts-
faits/030-eng.html. 
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this part of Canada’s border strategy strives to “‘push [the] borders out’. . . as far 
away from our [territorial] borders as possible.”81 In the words of the Statement 
of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing, “moving the focus of control 
of movement of people away from [the territorial] border to overseas, where 
potential violators of citizenship and immigration laws are interdicted prior to 
their arrival” has become a core feature of the country’s “Multiple Borders 
Strategy,” as Canada has branded its extensive variant of the shifting border 
strategy.82 For further details, see Figure 2: Canada: The Shifting Border—
Stretching Outward, located in the Appendix. 
As is traditionally the case in the United States, in Canada the act of 
“touching base” on the territory has significant legal consequences for the scope 
of rights and protections granted to asylum seekers, according to domestic and 
international legal obligations.83 In 1985, one of the earliest and most revered 
cases of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Charter era dealt with the rights of 
refugees. In that case, Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, the court 
held that if undocumented or irregular migrants reach Canadian territory, they are 
entitled to the protection of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.84 Those who 
have managed to physically reach Canada have a consecrated right to a refugee 
status hearing before facing potential removal from the country. Similar 
substantive protections and procedural guarantees are not automatically triggered 
if one is interdicted or intercepted before reaching Canada’s border. As part of a 
comprehensive study on immigration-triggered detention and removal, Canada’s 
Senate Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration concluded that the 
“interdiction abroad of people who are inadmissible to Canada is the most 
efficient manner of reducing the need for costly, lengthy removal processes.”85 
Under this scheme, Canada can avoid triggering the constitutional provisions that 
it had previously established to apply to protect the rights of non-citizens landing 
on Canadian territory.86 Investing such legal meaning in the distinction between 
“inside” and “outside” had the unintended consequence of incentivizing 
policymakers to introduce a slew of measures “to push out the border” in order to 
avert both the arrival of unauthorized migrants and the engagement of 
 
81 GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 8. 
82 SMU, supra note 2 (reflecting the premise that “border security and border management are based 
upon cooperation and collaboration”). 
83 The 1951 Refugee Convention “does not deal with the question of admission, and neither does it 
oblige a state of refuge to accord asylum as such.” Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The International Law of 
Refugee Protection, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 
(Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. eds., 2014). Today, the common State practice is that physical presence 
on the territory is required for claiming asylum there. See MATTHEW J. GIBNEY, THE ETHICS AND 
POLITICS OF ASYLUM: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RESPONSE TO REFUGEES (2004). 
84 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigr.), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, para. 81 (Can.). 
85 S. OF CAN., S. REP. OF THE STANDING COMM. ON CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION AND REMOVAL, at recommendation no. 18 (1998) (Can.),  
http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/361/citi/reports/rp1031513/citirp01/09-rec-e.h. 
86 Singh, supra note 86. 
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constitutionally-protected rights and procedures.87 Asylum seekers caught in the 
wide net of Canada’s interdiction and the shifting border strategy of enforcement 
are prevented from presenting their full cases to State authorities.88  
Being turned away before reaching Canadian territory is crucially important 
for defining the scope of the constitutional and international protections to which 
these non-citizens are entitled. For if the very same individuals were to land on 
Canadian soil, by virtue of Singh, they would have been entitled to a full oral 
hearing to determine the merits of their claims to stay, even if they were carrying 
improper documents. No similar rights apply to them if they are interdicted prior 
to reaching Canada. Here again, we see an example of the tension between human 
rights protections and the border control measures established beyond national 
territory, purportedly to “combat global irregular migration” (as official 
government documents state). From a human rights perspective, measures to 
outwardly “relocate” the border in order to skirt legal obligations are 
objectionable, as they reveal governmental attempts to evade and confine rights 
protections to the classic boundaries of the static Westphalian interpretation of 
territory in a world where mobility is increasingly regulated across time and space 
without constraint.89 The dynamism of the shifting border—its flexible and 
alternating inward and outward mobility—thus actively contributes to the 
immobility of those who seek to cross it. By barring certain bodies and populations 
from territorial arrival to well-off countries, the shifting border not only redraws 
the geography of power but also exacerbates the influence inequality and 
accidents of birthplace have on access to life-saving protection regimes.90 At-a-
distance control measures play a vital role in the process as they prevent would-
be immigrants and asylum seekers from activating the range of legal entitlements 
that they are owed in the destinations they seek to reach, while shielding affluent 
law-abiding countries from otherwise binding human rights obligations towards 
those escaping persecution. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to appreciate why such 
legal fictions, and the idea of a shifting border more broadly, are so attractive to 
policymakers who are under increasing pressures to act decisively in the face of 
growing voter anxiety over immigration, ever more frequently finding themselves 
in “crisis-control” mode.  
 
87 See, e.g., Efrat Arbel, Bordering the Constitution, Constituting the Border, 53 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 
824, 826-27 (2016).  
88 See generally François Crépeau & Delphine Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada: 
Reconciling Security Concerns with Human Rights Protection, 12 IRPP CHOICES 3 (2006). 
89 In response to shifting border techniques, the scope and application of international refugee and 
human rights laws should not be determined, from a moral and legal point of view, by the question of 
where the encounter with State officials (or their delegates) has occurred. What matters is that such an 
encounter took place and effective control was exercised, a point to which I return later in the analysis, 
in the final part of the discussion. See infra notes 200-220.  
90 INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION & UNHCR, A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION 
AND BUILDING STATE ASYLUM SYSTEMS 6 (2017) (“Providing protection to people fleeing in search 
of refuge is one of humanity’s most long-standing traditions—a shared value embedded in many 
religious and cultural traditions, and now part of international law.”).  
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Canada, along with many other wealthy nations, also relies heavily on private 
sector third-party actors, in particular airline carriers, as “enforcers” of its 
immigration regulations and border control provisions.91 As many seasoned 
travelers will know, it is usually airline personnel who verify that the required 
documents and visas are valid prior to permitting embarkation on international 
flights.92 They do so, at least in part, because their companies face steep financial 
penalties from the receiving countries if they transport improperly documented 
persons into their territories. Canadian law permits the government to seek 
reimbursement from airline carriers for “costs of detention, return, and, in some 
cases, medical care” associated with irregular migrants that arrive aboard their 
flights.93 Likewise, the Schengen Implementation Agreement obliges all members 
of the European Union to implement similar carrier sanctions.94 Allowing airline 
personnel to perform such passport control activities contributes to the growing 
role of private sector intermediaries in conducting what is arguably a central plank 
of sovereign authority: deciding whom to admit and whom to keep at bay.  
In the same vein, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia have also 
developed comparable mechanisms of migration regulation and control abroad, 
working in close cooperation with U.S. and Canadian overseas migration integrity 
and liaison officers. This partnership resembles the collaborative model of the 
“five-eyes” alliance (FVEY, as it is known), which is a wide ranging intelligence 
and data-sharing network with extensive surveillance capabilities that focuses, 
among other activities, on “remote control” border and migration control.95 Since 
the early 2000s, Member States of the European Union have followed suit and 
created an expanded transnational network of immigration liaison officers 
operating under an overarching EU directive framework. As a result, these 
interdiction programs have proliferated into a massive information-gathering 
“network of contacts with host-country officials, officials from other governments 
 
91 See generally Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Private Actor Involvement in Migration Management, 
in THE PRACTICE OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 527, 542 (André Nollkaemper 
et al. eds,, 2017); Michael Samers, An Emerging Geopolitics of ‘Illegal’ Immigration in the European 
Union, 6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 27 (2004). 
92 Canada as well as other countries have also signed memoranda of understanding with airline carriers 
that permit immigration officials abroad to refuse permission to individual passengers to board flights 
in return for indemnity from the administrative fines these airline carriers would have been obliged to 
pay if found carrying inadmissible passengers. See, e.g., KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Canada 
(Solicitor General), [2004] F.C. 308 (Can.).  
93 Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human 
Rights Collide, 21 REFUGE 6, 10 (2003). 
94 In the same vein, the 1990 Schengen Implementation Agreement obliges all members of the 
European Union to implement carrier sanctions. This mandate was further enhanced in 2001 by a 
European Council Directive that aims to harmonize these financial sanctions as a powerful regulatory 
tool, used here by member-States in concert, to diminish the prospects of arrival to their shores of 
unauthorized migrants.  
95 Aristide R. Zolberg, Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 70, 71 (Charles Hirschman et al. eds., 
1999) (using “remote control” to refer to unilateral visa control and related measures). Here, the term 
is used to relate to translational, multilateral measures that extend far beyond that term’s original 
definition. 
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in the designated region, airline personnel and law-enforcement agents.” 
Operating along the travel continuum, the network of trusted partners identifies 
and interdicts improperly-documented travelers at the earliest point at which their 
identity can be verified and as remotely as possible from the actual border.96  
No less significant for our discussion, these overseas government agents 
operate under the recommended guidelines developed by the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA).97 The existence of this non-state organization 
representing the global airline industry reveals not only the shifting location of 
the border but also the increased collaboration between private and public actors 
in regulating de-territorialized “edges” of well-off polities seeking to prevent 
admission of persons they deem unwanted.98  
C. Erasing Territory 
Australia has relocated its border more explicitly than Canada or the United 
States by creating a legal distinction between the country’s “migration zone” and 
the “Australia” that is recognizable on the map.99  The Migration Amendment Act 
of 2001 created this “excision” policy, which was expanded in 2005 and then 
again in 2013.100 This legislation authorizes Australia’s immigration officials to 
remove asylum seekers that have reached its “excised” territory as though they 
had never reached Australia, despite having physically landed on its shores.101 Put 
differently, those who reach the excision zone cannot make a valid asylum claim 
in Australia because they have never entered it in a legally cognizable way. The 
territory they reached is no longer “Australia” for immigration law purposes. This 
legal fiction further limits the procedural and substantive rights to which asylum 
seekers and other irregular migrants are entitled under domestic and international 
law.102 The excision policy also eliminates the possibility of judicial review; thus 
it not only redraws the territorial border but also attenuates legality in the 
 
96 TREAS. BD. OF CAN. SECRETARIAT, CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, 2008-09 REP. ON PLAN AND 
PRIORITIES, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/inst/bsf/bsf02-eng.asp; see also CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGRATION CAN., REV. OF THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL OFFICE NETWORK: FINAL REPORT, 
APPENDIX A: COMPARABLE ICO NETWORK MODELS.  
97 See generally WCO, IATA, and ICAO Guidelines on Advance Passenger Information (API) (2014). 
98 UNHCR, Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework and 
Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach, 10, U.N. Doc. EC/50/SC/CPR.17 (June 9, 2000). 
99 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Act No. 127/2001) (Austl.). 
100 Id.; Press Release, Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, Joint Statement with Minister 
for Justice & Customs: Government Strengthens Border Integrity, MPS 161/2001 (Sept. 17, 2001); 
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., DEP’T OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVS., EXCISING AUSTRALIA: ARE WE REALLY 
SHRINKING? Research Note no. 5, 2005-2006 (2005).  
101 Instead, they are immediately directed to third countries declared safe, such as Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea (until the latter’s court ruled the practice unconstitutional according to PNG law) where 
Australia has funded detention centers. Even if found to be refugees, such unauthorized arrivals cannot 
be settled in Australia, and must remain in Nauru or PNG, or be resettled elsewhere. See U.S. 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey (2002). 
102 Even before the creation of the excision zone, Australia introduced a mandatory detention policy 
for all arrivals without valid visas. See Migration Act 1958 (Act No. 62/1958) (Austl.). 
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process.103 In 2013, the excision zone was expanded through legislation to include 
the entire Australian mainland.104  In effect, this means that the border applies 
everywhere and nowhere at the same time. For further details, see Figure 3: The 
Shifting Border—Australia’s “Excision” Map, located in the Appendix. 
The legal consequences of arrival to Australia’s “erased” territory are both 
far-reaching and irreversible; those falling under the spell of excision are denied 
the opportunity to secure refugee status in Australia even after their claims are 
adjudicated. Excision provides a hocus-locus-pocus way to keep out those who 
were never wanted or invited. Under this legal fiction, asylum seekers who arrived 
by boat and without permission are ineligible to claim protection under Australian 
immigration laws. By erecting a limitless line-of-defense against unauthorized 
maritime arrivals, excision creates a legal barrier that makes the possibility of 
passing through the proverbial entry gates illusionary, even for those who have 
managed to reach the country’s physical territory. This logic is reminiscent of the 
“seeping” of the U.S. border into the interior and the resulting restriction of rights, 
but with a unique Australian twist of “erasing,” with the stroke of a pen, certain 
segments of its own territory off the map for migration regulation purposes.105 
More limited versions of “excision” also once operated in high-traffic 
airports in European capitals, which declared certain areas physically located in 
their national territories as extraterritorial “international zones” or “transit zones” 
where the standard protections of domestic and international law did not apply.106 
These transit zones functioned as legal “grey zones” in a limbo space, “in which 
officials ‘[we]re not obliged to provide asylum seekers or foreign individuals with 
some or all of the protections available to those officially on State territory.’” This 
practice was eventually challenged in the European Court of Human Rights, 
which concluded that “[d]espite its name, the international zone does not have 
extraterritorial status.”107 As a result, border-control actions in these transit zones 
were brought back into the fold of legality.108  
 
103 The terms legality and rule of law are notoriously difficult to define and are used interchangeably 
in my discussion. Martin Krygier, Transformations of the Rule of Law: Legal, Liberal and Neo-, in 
THE POLITICS OF LEGALITY IN A NEOLIBERAL AGE 19–20 (Ben Golder & Daniel McLoughlin eds., 
2018) (referring to “a number of ideas, among them constitutionalism, due process, legality, justice, 
that make claims for the proper character and role of law in well-ordered States and societies… Appeal 
to the rule of law [or legality] signals the hope that law might contribute to articulating, channeling, 
disciplining, constraining and informing—rather than merely serving—the exercise of power. I[t] 
refers collectively to such contributions as tempering power.”). 
104 Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (Act. No. 
35/2013) (Austl.). 
105 This unprecedented act was prefaced by a governmental clarification that the excised zones were 
not altogether removed from Australian sovereign territory. See PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., supra note 
91; Anthea Vogl, Over the Borderline: A Critical Inquiry into the Geography of Territorial Excision 
and the Securitisation of the Australian Border, 38 U. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 114, 137 (2015). 
106 See generally Mark B. Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession, 1 
INT’L POL. SOCIOLOGY 49 (2007) (discussing airports, seaports, and train stations as what I call “gray 
zones”). 
107 Amuur v. France, App. No 19776/92, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1, 25 (1996).  
108 See id.  
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The creation of these legal “gray zones” is not entirely new. The United 
States once used its navy base in Guantanamo Bay as a repository for asylum 
seekers, particularly Haitians, whose shattered boats were intercepted on the high 
seas to prevent those onboard from claiming refuge at “our gates.”109 Again, we 
witness the craftsmanship of using legal definitions and categories to interdict 
unwanted entrants before they can reach the actual border (unless, as in 
Australia’s extreme variant of the shifting border, that territory itself is “excised”). 
Along with the spatial expansion of the zone of excision, Australia has 
adopted another means of border-shifting. Since 2013, all “asylum seekers who 
unlawfully arrive anywhere in Australia” must be transferred to third countries 
for offshore processing.110 The Australian government calls this policy “regional 
processing,” which in practice has meant that those who reach the excision zone 
are transferred to offshore locations.111 The offshore locations are remote islands 
in the Pacific, such as Nauru, a tiny microstate island-nation that is 4,500 
kilometers away from Australia, or Manus Island in Papua New Guinea.112 There, 
asylum seekers may languish for years while the immigration authorities process 
and assess the asylum claims.113 Australia is the only country in the world that 
uses other countries to process asylum claims. Close to eighty percent of those 
transferred to such offshore processing centers have proven they have credible 
claims.114 These asylum seekers were on average detained for 450 days, and 
almost one quarter of the detained/incarcerated population spent more than two 
 
109 These strategies of “containment” of irregular mobility through foreign maritime enforcement have 
long been employed by the United States, which has entered bilateral agreements with the Bahamas, 
the Dominican Republic and other countries in the Caribbean; these signatory countries regularly 
interdict boats and summarily return unauthorized travelers heading toward the United States to their 
place of embarkation. For an exposition of the governmental practice of detention without trial of 
Haitian refugees at Guantanamo in the 1990s, and the legal challenges that followed, see generally 
Harold Hongju Koh, The Haitian Refugee Litigation: A Case Study in Transnational Public Law 
Litigation, 18 MD. J. INT’L L. 1 (1994).  
110 Migration Amendment, supra note 99. For a concise overview of these legislative changes, see 
Australia’s Offshore Processing Regime, REFUGEE COUNCIL OF AUSTL., 
https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/getfacts/seekingsafety/asylum/offshore-processing/briefing/ (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
111 31 Oct. 2012, Parl Deb HR (2012) (Can.) at 12738-12740, (Chris Bowen, Minister of Immigration 
and Citizenship, discussing the Migration Amendment). 
112 Offshore Processing: An Overview, KALDOR CENTRE, 
https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/offshore-processing-overview (last visited Jan. 13, 
2019). 
113 Stefanie Anderson, Immigration Detention Times on Nauru and Manus Island Blow Out to 450-
day Average Under Liberals, ABC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-
13/immigration-detention-times-blow-out-to-almost-450-days/7085264. 
114 Elibritt Karlsen, Australia’s Offshore Processing of Asylum Seekers in Nauru and PNG: A Quick 
Guide to Statistics and Resources, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL. (DEC. 19, 2016), 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs
/rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/Offshore. See also Amanda Erickson, Here's What the Dumb Deal On 
Refugees With Australia Actually Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/02/heres-what-the-dumb-deal-on-
refugees-with-australia-actually-says/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c36955d2c59e. 
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years in the facilities.115 Even those recognized as refugees are forbidden for life 
from settlement in Australia, alas, due to the “original sin” of arriving on its 
excised territory. The erased territory thus becomes a legal black hole, a 
gravitational field so intense that no unauthorized migrant can ever escape it. This 
ironclad policy—the one-way ticket away from Australia—has recently attracted 
the interest of European policymakers desperately seeking answers to their 
respective challenges of responding to uninvited migration flows and has fueled 
discussion of building migrant “reception” centers in North Africa and deeper in 
the heart of the continent. 116  
 Australia has invented one of the most striking manifestations of the 
shifting border by legally redefining the area of Australian territory upon which 
asylum claims can be made, and by removing and “emplacing” any intercepted 
irregular migrants to offshore processing centers in remote locations in poorer and 
less stable third countries. Australia’s restrictive policy offers a remarkable 
attestation to the willingness of countries to deter unauthorized migration flows, 
even at the cost of blatantly breaching domestic and international rights-protection 
obligations to which they have committed themselves. To complicate the picture 
even further, there are some early indications that Australia’s highly problematic 
interpretation of its refugee protection obligations is proving effective in 
advancing its stated policy mission: to stop unauthorized boat arrivals.117 As a 
representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Indonesia—a major 
transit hub in the region for asylum seekers and human smugglers heading toward 
Australia—noted: “[w]ord that the prospects of reaching Australia by boat … are 
now virtually zero appears to have reached smugglers and would-be asylum 
seekers in countries of origin.”118 Such focus on deterrence and “reclaiming” 
border protection is in turn used politically to justify the tough policies Australia 
adopted in the first place. Despite domestic contestation and international 
condemnation, the major political parties in Australia have refused to reverse the 
policy of offshore processing.119 This refusal raises a host of pressing queries 
 
115 Id.  
116 On treating the Australian model as a potential blueprint for Europe, see “In Deutschland ist sehr 
viel Bewegung in die richtige Richtung”, WELT, Mar. 24, 2018, 
https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article174864314/Oesterreichs-Kanzler-Sebastian-Kurz-In-
Deutschland-ist-sehr-viel-Bewegung-in-die-richtige-Richtung.html (interviewing Austrian 
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz). 
117 AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, AUSTRALIA BY BOAT? NO ADVANTAGE (2012). In the case of Australia, 
“concerns over ‘unauthorised’ boat arrivals or ‘boat people’ (also referred to as ‘irregular maritime 
arrivals’) have occupied successive governments since the 1970s.” PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., BOAT 
ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA SINCE 1976 (2013), 
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n/2012-2013/boatarrivals.  
118 Asylum Seekers left High and Dry in Indonesia, IRIN NEWS (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/99908/asylum-seekers-left-high-and-dry-indonesia (quoting UNHCR 
country representative in Indonesia, Manuel Jordano). 
119 For an overview of these positions, see Robert Manne, This Pains Me, but It’s Time to Compromise 
on Australia’s Cruel Asylum Seeker Policy, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/23/this-pains-me-but-its-time-to-
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about how to avert the denial of constitutional and human rights by the very 
institutions and processes designed to protect them and whose voices and interests 
ought to be considered when challenging such policies. Australia is not alone in 
facing such quandaries. From Europe to North America, incumbent leaders and 
their contenders are trying to appease the anxieties of voters fearing “loss of 
control” over borders and membership boundaries. The lethal combination of the 
perceived loss of control and the apparent deterrence effect of a restrictive policy 
forces us to rethink the complex relationships between official and unofficial 
routes of passage, as well as the uneasy interactions among countries of origin, 
transit, destination, offshoring locations, and the activities of human smugglers—
a dynamic constellation that the literature has largely overlooked. 
D. Who Guards the (Legal) Guards? 
If we conceptualize borders as “crucial sites from which the nation-state is 
narrated and constituted,”120 Australia’s heavy-handed approach brings into sharp 
relief several important quandaries. Key among them is: who guards our legal 
guards? Australia’s High Court has on several occasions reviewed various aspects 
of Australia’s excision policy and offshore processing framework. In several 
landmark decisions, the High Court favored the claims of those in excised 
territories. These decisions include the cases known as Plaintiff M61/2010 and 
Plaintiff M69/2010, in which the High Court unanimously found that two Sri 
Lankan asylum seekers detained on Australia’s Christmas Island had been denied 
procedural fairness.121  The Court’s decision led the government to amend certain 
aspects of the processing of claims beyond mainland Australia.122 In another case, 
Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the High Court 
struck down the government’s so-called “Malaysian solution,” which proposed 
that Australia swap 800 asylum seekers held in detention after they arrived by 
boat to the excision zone with 4,000 refugees waiting for resettlement from 
Malaysia. 123 The Court found that Malaysia is neither a signatory to the Refugee 
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Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 22 (Austl.), the High Court unanimously rejected a 
challenge to the constitutional validity of sections 198AB and 198 AD of the Migration Act 1958, as 
amended by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 
2012 (Cth) (Austl.), which gives the immigration minister the power to designate regional (offshore) 
processing countries. These amendments were introduced into law in response to a previous ruling of 
the High Court, Plaintiff M70, a decision in which the Court struck down the government’s “Malaysian 
solution.”   
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Convention nor does it recognize the status of refugees under its domestic law.124 
However, the very same justice system that protects all refugees but those arriving 
without authorization by boat, ultimately upheld some of the most controversial 
aspects of the country’s excision and offshoring tactics. As Robert Cover 
observed in his now-classic Justice Accused, judges may feel compelled to uphold 
“neutral” legal rules despite perceiving them as unjust, in the process causing 
violence through the words and acts of law.125 For asylum seekers who are excised 
and offshored, the law failed to provide solace or safety and imposed violence 
instead. 
An unexpected twist in this saga occurred when the Supreme Court of Papua 
New Guinea, unlike the High Court of Australia, ruled that the practice of 
transferring and detaining asylum seekers on Manus Island was both illegal and 
in violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty. 126 The Court held that 
because the “asylum seekers held [on Manus Island] did not arrive…of their own 
volition, they had not broken any immigration law,” and “keeping them in 
indefinite detention, where they face frequent acts of violence and suffer from 
poor health care, therefore, violated their constitutional protections.” 127 The Court 
ordered immediate steps to end the detention, and the government of Papua New 
Guinea requested that Australia make alternative arrangements.128 Asylum 
seekers remaining at Manus Island are currently in a state of limbo. In the wake 
of the center’s closure, they have lost access to running water, electricity, 
medicine, and working toilets, and their food supplies are dwindling.129 Yet many 
have refused relocation to other sites in Papua New Guinea out of fear for their 
safety. Some were forcibly removed by local police forces from the (now 
decommissioned) Australian facility. The UNHCR has warned of an “unfolding 
humanitarian crisis” and has called on Australian authorities to act based on their 
responsibility in the original offshore transfer and eventual internment.130 New 
Zealand offered to resettle some of the refugees remaining in Manus Island, but 
the Australian government has yet to accept this proposal.131 Litigation has 
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Stéphanie Dujarric, Spokesman for Secretary-General António Guterres (Nov. 3, 2017), 
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2019] BORDERING MIGRATION/MIGRATING BORDERS 121 
commenced before the High Court of Australia and in Papua New Guinea to 
require that these offshore refugees and asylum seekers be brought back to 
Australia, but neither country’s courts have ruled on the matter. A growing choir 
of voices from civil society and human rights organizations, both local and global, 
has called on the Australian government to take accountability for the escalating 
situation, demanding “an end to this cruelty.”132 Such democratic protests have 
made a dent in the past, for example by pressuring the government to bring back 
to Australia some of the detained on Nauru and Manus Island who required 
medical attention.133 The jury is still out on the impact of such contestation and 
protest on finding a resolution to the current deadlock. 
E. Big Data and iBorder Control 
In disrupting the Mondrian-like precision of clearly delineated and 
jurisdictionally exclusive territorial States that has undergirded the Westphalian 
international system of States (at least in principle), the shifting border tacitly and 
covertly redefines the relationship between membership, territory, and 
sovereignty. As such, it provides a rare opportunity to reflect on the distributive 
implications of selectively opening and closing the border.  
For the bulk of the twentieth century, the mobility of those relegated by birth 
to the wrong side of the tracks of prosperity and opportunity was manifestly 
controlled at official checkpoints by “guards [that] have guns,” as Joseph Carens 
memorably put it.134 Alternatively, today’s restrictions against unwanted and 
uninvited entrants rely on ultra-sophisticated, high-tech, partly invisible but 
always present transportable legal walls, aided by ever-expanding surveillance 
systems and remote control border regulation activities. As the Canadian Border 
Service Agency explains, the ubiquitous shifting border can, in principle, operate 
at “any point at which the identity of the traveler can be verified,” giving full 
meaning to the notion of a border that is simultaneously nowhere and 
everywhere.135  
In Europe, for example, the European Union devised the integrated border 
management strategy. This strategy relies on a multi-tiered control model that 
seeks to track the movement of non-EU citizens, known as third-country 
nationals, “from the point of departure in countries of origin, all throughout 
transit, and up to their arrival in the EU.”136 Within the Union, inland control 
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measures, including detection, investigation, and return, are applicable to third-
country nationals deemed to lack status (regularly referred to as “illegal 
immigrants”), as are futuristic iBorder control strategies that “re-engineer” the 
system of border crossing and migration control.137  
Pilot projects funded by the European Union will enable “automatic control” 
procedures, involving pre-registration, whereby “[t]travelers perform a short, 
automated, non-invasive interview with an avatar, undergo a lie detection and are 
linked to any pre-existing authority data.” This data will then be stored in large 
databases and connected with “portable, wireless connected iBorderCtrl units that 
can be used inside buses, trains or any other point” to verify the identity of the 
travelers and “calculat[e] a cumulative risk factor for each [individual].”138 Here, 
the once-fixed territorial border is not only shifting, but also evolving into an 
operational individualized-control system, where each person “carries” the border 
with her as she moves across space and place. The border attaches to her pre-
arrival, at crossing stations, and wherever and whenever she travels within the 
protected and surveilled territorial space—today within the area of free movement 
in Europe, tomorrow (potentially) the world.139  
Here, the underlying objective of ensuring that entrants meet all legal 
requirements takes on a new social, political, and technological meaning. Such 
individualized control systems transform and blur the regulation of pre- and post-
arrival movement and risk morphing into a “society of control,” where everyone 
(non-citizen and citizen alike) is tracked and encoded.140 Furthermore, while these 
new surveillance techniques that utilize a combination of algorithmic machine 
learning and human vetting are neutral in theory, they may produce divergent and 
discriminatory results by reaffirming and intensifying practices of racial and 
geographic profiling.141  
Such global ID systems have long been the dream of law enforcers, but they 
are now ever-closer to becoming a reality. Even the United Nations has teamed 
up with leading technology firms to explore plans for creating a digital ID network 
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using blockchain technology to provide tamper-resistant legal documents for 
refugees and other displaced persons who lack official documents. Such a digital 
ID would create a “‘stamp’—a unique identifier between the refugee and the data 
on the servers—that proves they have been authenticated for each service they 
receive” at refugee camps or by official aid organizations.142 While informed by 
benevolent intentions, such initiatives may violate bearers’ privacy and restrict 
their international mobility, especially if their “stamp” indicates passage through 
a third-country deemed safe. As a result, digital ID may potentially prohibit 
onward travel or trigger return if the migrant’s intended country of destination has 
signed readmission agreements with these transit locations. 
F. Tracking and Stratifying Mobility 
Beyond reinventing the “moveable” border while selectively opening and 
closing its gates of admission, destination countries are developing and 
implementing new surveillance technologies that cross time and space. These 
technologies are implicated in bilateral and multilateral agreements with countries 
of origin and transit that treat the latter as migration “buffer zones” for wealthier 
nations. This new conception of the shifting border has coincided with the rise of 
“big data” and propagated the creation of enormous databases that store biometric 
information and electronic passenger name records.143 Sharing these records prior 
to travel has replaced traditional interactions between the individual and State 
officials at the actual territorial border, because, as the UK Home Office 
revealingly put it, this border encounter “can be too late—they [unauthorized 
entrants] have achieved their goal in reaching our shores.”144 For governments to 
achieve this ambitious yet Orwellian vision, the location, operation, and logic of 
the border must be redefined through a complex conceptual and operational 
framework that allows state officials or their delegates (increasingly operating 
transnationally and in collaboration with third parties and private sector actors) to 
screen and intercept travelers en route to their desired destinations, and long 
before the travelers are within their territories. Pre-travel electronic clearance is 
now required as a matter of course, even for those in possession of “high-value” 
passports, including travelers hailing from EU member States.145 The government 
of the destination country must approve such electronic travel authority before the 
traveler embarks on his or her journey, and it is linked electronically to the 
traveler’s passport.146 Without such authorization, it is impossible to board a plane 
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heading to the United States, Canada, or Australia or to enter these countries. 
European countries are expected to follow suit by implementing the European 
Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) in 2021.147 This additional 
layer of preclearance and information-gathering creates a powerful yet invisible 
electronic border that applies everywhere, adjusting to the location and risk profile 
of the traveler. The electronic authorization process is intentionally detached from 
and precedes the act of territorial admission, facilitating mobility for approved or 
trusted travelers while denying access to all others. 
While these high-tech borders are designed to keep out unwanted and 
uninvited entrants, even trusted travelers—those who benefit from the highest 
level of flexibility and mobility in crossing borders—must now have their 
identities verified before embarking on international travel at airports and at other 
regulation points. “Smart” and automated-entry gates have iris scans or other 
biometric readers that run through multiple national and global databases that 
cross-reference and authenticate the trusted-traveler’s identity, low-risk status, 
and un-flagged profile. In an increasing number of airports, the initial decision 
regarding whether the golden gates of admission will open or shut is determined 
not by a human agent, but by EasyPASS or other automated systems of 
immigration clearance and border control.148 These automated systems 
authenticate digital data and are coded to identify risk factors based on 
sophisticated algorithms (themselves hardly ever subject to open, democratic 
review).149 In the age of big data and shifting borders, Ali Baba’s “open sesame!” 
incantation assumes a new magic and mythos.  
For those lacking the requisite credentials, the unending technological 
innovation and preemptive mobility review encoded into the shifting border 
strategy makes it ever-harder to lawfully set foot in the more affluent polities they 
desperately seek to enter.150 This asymmetry raises serious questions of justice in 
not only the initial allocation of membership affiliations but also the enduring 
inequality of mobility opportunities.151 Those who lack privileged biometric 
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2019] BORDERING MIGRATION/MIGRATING BORDERS 125 
indicators and the required documentation have little if any option to lawfully 
cross international borders.152 Coupled with restrictive immigration categories 
and limited travel visas for those entering from poorer and less stable countries, 
the shifting border may have the unintended effect of pushing unauthorized 
mobility further underground. This in turn triggers policy concerns about the rise 
of a lucrative black market for increasingly sophisticated human-trafficking and 
smuggling networks. These concerns breed political pressures that help explain 
(although they do not justify) why and how governments seek to sever the knot 
that has traditionally tied a fixed territorial border to migration control. By 
attempting to cover the globe with “transportable” regulation and surveillance, 
they may head off uninvited entrants before they begin their journey.153 
By identifying the shifting border as an alternative to the established 
theoretical poles of “static” and “disappearing” boundaries, I hope to have shown 
that neither of those visions captures the dynamics of the new regulatory regime 
of mobility and migration control. Affluent countries’ ability to flexibly redraw 
the border for migration control and admission regulation is a key new tool to 
reassert control over their allegedly “broken borders.” At the same time, these 
policies belie the demise-and-fall predictions of those who have declared the 
“erasing of the world of spaces,” meaning the abolition of States and borders as 
primary organizational units of the current world system.  
For those locked outside the prosperous core of developed countries, border 
and migration control is anything but a relic of the past. For the vast majority of 
the global population who have received the shorter stick in the birthright lottery, 
barriers to international mobility have not disappeared but have instead been 
retooled and reinvented.154 When a non-citizen is stopped before she can ever 
reach our entry gates, the likelihood of her being able to embark on lawful 
admission and gain eventual access to citizenship is close to nil. By redefining the 
core liberty interests of those residing in countries of origin, transit, and 
destination, today’s extensive “re-bordering” efforts contribute to enforcing and 
sustaining a global mobility divide.155  
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G. Transit Countries as Border Enforcers 
If we turn our gaze to Europe, we find a continent scrambling to find coherent 
responses to the major ethical and political conflicts that the 2015 migration crisis 
has unleashed. When it comes to devising new measures to regulate mobility, the 
European Union and its Member States have borrowed more than one page from 
the shifting-border book. Much like the United States maintaining a hundred-mile 
interior border zone, the Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU) has ruled 
that border and migration enforcement activities can stretch inward beyond the 
actual, territorial border of members States.156 Specifically, it authorized border 
“officials responsible for border surveillance and the monitoring of foreign 
nationals” to carry out their activities within twenty kilometers of the border, 
crafting a European variant of the United States’ “constitution-free” zone, here 
translated to the denser continental geography.157 In 2017, the CJEU reviewed the 
matter again, holding that “random” and “baseless identification checks” cannot 
be used as a way to circumvent free mobility within Europe.158 However, so long 
as such checks are proportional and done “to prevent unauthorized entry,” identity 
checks can take place not just within the twenty-kilometer zone, as previously 
ruled, but within a broader territorial range: within thirty kilometers of the land 
border and within a radius of fifty kilometers of the sea border, as well as in train 
stations nationwide and onboard trains anywhere.159 Again, we find the same 
inland “stretching” dynamic already witnessed elsewhere. What is perplexing in 
this context, however, is that such shifting border measures are now exercised 
within Europe’s free movement zone.160  
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In addition to the above-mentioned measures of tightening inland control and 
shifting responsibility and accountability (as well as finger pointing) among 
European countries, the European Union and its member States have adopted an 
extensive outward-looking bordering strategy, known as “externalization,” which 
extends beyond the boundaries of the continent and shifts focus to migrants’ 
countries of origins or transit.161 This has led the European Union to establish one 
of the world’s most complex, interagency, multi-tiered visions of the shifting 
border, comprised of pre-entry controls at countries of origin and transit all the 
way through to removal of irregular migrants after they have reached EU 
territory.162 This removal procedure is facilitated by the shared European Return 
Directive and a growing list of bilateral and multilateral “readmission 
agreements” negotiated with poorer and less stable non-EU countries to which 
irregular migrants can be returned, even if they merely passed through such 
countries en route to Europe.163 
Europe’s externalization policy creates a ring of protection outside the EU. 
It involves a “close partnership” with non-EU States from near and far through 
programs such as the Neighborhood Policy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the 
Balkan Stability Pact (which was later formalized in to the Regional Cooperation 
Council), the Africa-EU Partnership, the Valletta Action Plan, the Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility, and so on.164 These policies are designed to 
enforce migration control in collaboration with countries of origin or “at the 
earliest possible stage”; they combine readmission agreements with development 
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incentives and capacity-building of asylum systems in the region concerned.165 
They also contain incentives for countries to agree to readmit refused asylum 
seekers from Europe that “transited” through their territories, such as promises for 
easier visa processing for the citizens of the signatory third-countries.166 Such an 
incentive structure highlights the unequal bargaining power of member states of 
the European Union and the Union as a whole vis-à-vis transit countries, although 
it also reveals how the latter may gain concessions in exchange for promises to 
“stem the flow.”167 The controversial agreement between the European Union and 
Turkey, which involves the transfer of 3.2 billion euros and other inducements in 
return for Turkey’s assistance with “‘keep[ing] people in the region’ and out of 
Europe,” is a classic example of outsourcing migration and border control.168  
Earlier bilateral and multilateral agreements have been criticized as 
absolving EU-countries of their otherwise binding human rights obligations. 
These agreements have insisted upon concessions and collaboration from non-EU 
States, pressuring them to take responsibility for providing protection to forced 
migrants, including asylum seekers, as soon as possible after the initial 
displacement and as close as possible to countries of origin or transit. Such 
agreements recast countries of origin or transit as “gatekeepers to the developed 
world” and, in the process, allow wealthier countries to insulate themselves from 
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legal responsibility towards refugees and other persons entitled to international 
protection.  
The shifting border is difficult to contain and confine. Now that nations have 
escaped the once-fixed territorial boundaries and legal restraints that were 
inherent to the old, static border regime, we must explore potential remedies and 
reforms. Before I turn to elaborate on such ideas, and how they might be put into 
action, I wish to locate the shifting border in the context of recent discussions 
about the diffusion or “migration” of constitutional and human rights norms and 
practices. I argue that an understanding of borders as mobile constructs provides 
an important corrective to prevalent theoretical accounts. 
III. 
TRANSNATIONAL BORROWING AND THE DIFFUSION OF RESTRICTIVE POLICIES 
In academic circles, the idea of policy diffusion has now become almost 
synonymous with the expansion of human rights. Here, however, we are faced 
with a pattern of circumventing and narrowing such rights and protections as they 
apply to a particularly vulnerable category of irregular migrants. The bulk of legal 
literature on the “borrowing” of constitutional ideas across borders has focused 
on comparative and international (or where relevant, regional) influences on 
domestic norms and structures. Studies of such processes have led to the 
conclusion that the effects of such borrowing practices are “nothing short of 
transformative.”169 In the same vein, a growing number of empirical studies have 
emphasized the importance of policy diffusion in explaining the spread of 
democratization, liberalism, and human rights.170 The emergent consensus is that 
when policies “travel”—across national borders, organizational domains, or 
multiple levels of governance regimes (global to local), the results have frequently 
been a favorable increase in rights protection, both de jure and de facto.171 The 
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argument is that apex courts in the world of new constitutionalism now regularly 
“borrow” progressive ideas from one another by, for example, citing precedents 
from comparable countries as a source of persuasive authority.172 Through this 
transnational dialogue, judges are advancing a new and expanded catalogue of 
rights protections for citizens and non-citizens alike. But there is another, darker, 
side to this increased cross-border dialogue. Just as progressive ideas about the 
scope and extent of rights protections can travel quickly, so can restrictive 
policies. Call this the constrictive precedent problem: emulating the “worst case” 
rather than following the “best case” precedent. 
Just as human rights and constitutional ideas can travel across borders and 
organizational terrain, so may restrictive immigration measures, anti-
constitutional or abusive constitutional measures travel just as easily and 
effectively, if not faster, across borders and organizational terrain.173 A powerful 
example of this pattern of restrictive policy emulation emerged following 9/11 
with the global spread of anti-terrorism laws.174 Despite a degree of local 
variation, these policies reveal several overarching convergence features, 
including the concentration of power in the hands of executives, increased ease of 
surveillance of the public, restriction of due process protections, breach of privacy 
and other potential limitations on protected rights and liberties as part of an ever-
fragile search for a new balance between the competing demands of security and 
freedom.175 A similar trend has emerged in many parts of the world with the surge 
of “unconstitutional constitutional amendments.”176 The structure and logic of the 
shifting border have helped germinate this pattern of restrictive (rather than rights-
enhancing) policy diffusion. This is demonstrated, for example, by inter-
jurisdictional emulation (subject to adjustment in response to specific country 
conditions) and the leveraging of cooperation by other actors to enforce “non-
entrée” to prosperous jurisdictions.177 These patterns are particularly visible, as 
we saw earlier, in processes that involve transferring responsibility and, in effect, 
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“outsourcing migration and asylum policy by subcontracting controls” to regional 
partners or migrants’ countries of origin and transit.178  
Once a reputable court or government adopts a highly restrictive policy 
towards unauthorized migrants, other governments facing similar predicaments 
may decide to follow that earlier restrictive decision or policy (even if legally and 
morally contentious) as a persuasive precedent or “model” to justify their own 
subsequent choices limiting the substantive rights or procedural protections 
accorded to vulnerable migrant populations such as refugees, asylum seekers, and 
other humanitarian causes. Tellingly, when Australia initiated and then expanded 
its divisive “stop the boats” operations in the Pacific, advocates of these policies 
argued that, contrary to the sober objections raised by human rights groups and 
other non-governmental organizations, such operations were both permissible and 
unexceptional. In a classic manifestation of the impact of the constrictive 
precedent, Australian officials readily drew on the U.S. experience, stating 
publicly in defense of Australian tow-backs that the “U.S. Coast Guard has been 
turning boats around in the Caribbean for years.”179 “If the United States (or any 
other affluent, rule-of-law democracy) can do it, so can we,” seems to be the 
operative rationale that guides such restrictive-policy-migration emulation.  
The global influence of the US Supreme Court decision in Sale offers a 
classic example of this pattern at work. In that decision, the Supreme Court held 
that summary return of migrants, including asylum seekers, interdicted on the high 
seas does not engage the non-refoulement obligation to which the United States 
has committed through both its domestic and international law obligations.180 On 
this account, non-refoulement obligations do not apply extraterritorially.181 The 
Sale Court upheld an image of the border as static and fixed, standing at the 
territorial edges of the country. The interdiction of Haitian boats by US Coast 
Guard ships, which operated far away from the protected territory, was not 
“visible” to a Court that examined it under the classic Westphalian lens.182 The 
United States’ continued commitment to this legal position is clear from its 
response to UNHCR’s Advisory Opinion on Extraterritorial Application of Non-
Refoulement Obligations, released in 2007.183 
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The Sale ruling and the United States’ permissive stance on preemptive 
interdiction has received critical rebuke. The English Court of Appeals, for 
example, broke the semi-sacred principle of international comity among courts 
when it referred to the case as “wrongly decided.” Going a step further, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights held that, contrary to Sale, the non-
refoulement provision in the Refugee Convention “has no geographical 
limitations,” thus interpreting legal responsibility and jurisdiction in a more robust 
fashion than ever before, no longer focusing solely on territorial location (as under 
the static model) but also on situations whereby a state exercises “effective 
control” or “public power” beyond its borders. A growing number of international 
law and migration scholars echo this judgement call. However, these statements 
are non-binding and Sale has proven more resilient than some have predicted. It 
has provided indirect guidance and legitimacy for comparable jurisdictions to 
adopt similarly obstructive interdiction policies that “align in a control 
continuum…at several stages of the migrant’s journey.”184 These policies 
currently escape the reach of legal responsibility and accountability by claiming 
that non-refoulement does not apply extraterritorially.185 Australian courts, for 
example,  have interpreted the fact that the United States has already provided 
justification for such a rights-restricting approach as “license” to follow suit.186  
In a similar vein, the European Union’s invention of the “safe third country” 
concept has travelled widely and globally, inspiring, among other examples, the 
safe third country agreement between the United States and Canada.187 Norway’s 
recent designation of Russia as a “safe third country” to which asylum seekers can 
be returned, thus denying them access to Norway’s—and by extension, 
Europe’s—asylum procedures, is another example.188 In turn, the Australian 
policy of declaring maritime arrivals unauthorized by virtue of reaching the 
excision zone has inspired Canadian legislation to declare those arriving without 
authorization by boat as “irregular arrivals,” thereby restricting their substantive 
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and procedural rights and protections.189 Even if eventually recognized as 
refugees, such arrivals face a freeze period of five years before they can apply for 
permanent residence.190 In short, ideas travel quickly and furiously across borders, 
especially when policymakers feel pressure to demonstrate action to counter the 
public perception of loss of control. For those en route or escaping from harm’s 
way the result is further restrictions and tightening of rights by precisely those 
premium democratic destinations that are globally perceived to be beacons of the 
rule-of-law. With such behavior advanced by the leaders of the so-called “free 
world,” there is real room for concern that further restrictions and tightening of 
controls from countries that formally adhere to the values of human rights, 
freedom and democracy will justify infringement on protected rights by partner 
States that may have less than dazzling records on human rights.191 
The sheer reach and magnitude of the shifting border also invites revisiting 
the age-old question of how to tame menacing governmental authority. As the 
shifting border has now become almost boundless in its conceptual framing and 
spatial manifestation, it has become increasingly difficult to challenge with 
traditional legal tools and conceptions of constitutionalism and human rights, both 
of which still rely on territoriality as their core grounding principle. If we seek to 
develop fresh legal responses to tame the rights-restricting consequences of the 
shifting border, we must rethink the relationship between law and territory, space 
and political organization—a task to which I now turn.  
IV. 
A NEW APPROACH 
Taking into account the gravity of the problems addressed, I now turn to 
explore strategies by which these pervasive patterns might be challenged or 
changed. Because it engages the basic building blocks of the modern state—
territoriality, sovereignty, and legal spatiality—this transformation entails some 
of the core legal and normative questions of our time.  
A. On Space and Political Organization: Hannah Arendt’s Intervention 
Writing after the atrocities of WWII and the Holocaust, Hannah Arendt 
astutely observed the following: “[s]uddenly, there was no place on earth where 
migrants could go without the severest restrictions, no country where they would 
be assimilated, no territory where they could found a new community of their 
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own. This moreover, had nothing to do with any material problem of 
overpopulation; it was a problem not of space but of political organization.”192 
While the world has changed dramatically since the publication of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism in 1955, the plight of refugees and displaced persons still remains 
one of the biggest and most pressing human rights issues of our time. For Arendt, 
the “right to have rights” could only be realized in the context of a political 
community in which we are political equals who are judged “through our actions 
and opinions, by what we do and say,” not on account of ascriptive factors such 
as ethnic lineage or descent.193 No less significant, for Arendt the tragedy of the 
migrants and refugees was that they had “no place on earth where [they] could go 
without the severest restrictions.”194 This is a problem wholly entrenched in the 
Westphalian system that accords exclusive sovereignty to national jurisdictions 
over every habitable space on earth. For Arendt, the fulfillment of political 
equality could only take place within a particular kind of territorially-demarcated 
political community: the modern state. Despite her radicalism and ground-
breaking ideas, Arendt’s writing, a product of her own historical period, manifests 
a rather fixed and rigid vision of territoriality, corresponding to the static view of 
the border. 
Today, paradoxically, States themselves are reinventing sovereignty and 
territoriality, showing a remarkable capacity to adapt to new environments. For 
States to do nothing in the face of large-scale global mobility pressures would 
counter the basic sovereign instinct to control the border. Governments and 
growing sectors of their populations perceive the irregular movement of people 
as risking the stability of the international order, and view border control as “either 
or both a security imperative and a life-saving humanitarian endeavor.”195 Such 
perceptions inform discussions of contemporary migration as a “crisis” for a 
multitude of actors: those seeking mobility but denied access to legal channels of 
entry; for neighboring countries on the brink of insolvency and political 
instability; for transit countries endowed with growing responsibilities to stop the 
flow of migration; for governmental and non-governmental humanitarian 
agencies carrying the brunt of meeting the fundamental needs of migrants and 
refugees stranded in “temporary” situations which seem to never end; and for 
destination countries and supranational bodies fearing “loss of control.” 
Ultimately, the debate over the effect of irregular movements of people also leads 
to conclusions of a crisis for the Westphalian order itself, since sovereignty is 
(unrealistically) expected to generate unbridled control over cross-border 
movement. In Europe, the failure to offer adequate responses to the sharp increase 
of asylum applications in the summer of 2015 under a common framework led to 
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the return of internal borders.196 These re-erected borders combine visible and 
invisible elements of migration control as States attempt to regain and display 
their potent sovereign authority. 
B. Restraining Government Authority 
Today’s harsh realities reveal the inadequacy of seeking legal cover under 
the static conception of the border while persistently breaching it by devising far 
more dynamic, multifaceted and de-territorialized techniques of governance that 
rely largely on the flexible variability of the shifting border. In the tension between 
States’ skirting their constitutional and human rights obligations and their 
declared commitment to upholding them, an opening might be found to challenge 
the unresolved contradictions embedded in the shifting border.197 
Refuting the predictions of globalists and others about the imminent demise 
of borders and the waning of sovereignty, the relaxing of the linkage between 
territory and authority has given greater latitude for governments and regulatory 
agencies to develop a whole new way to decouple the sovereign act of migration 
regulation and control from the site of territory. What are the implications of this 
massive, yet still under-theorized, change of the locus of the exercise of migration 
control? Does the new shifting-border reality introduce not only greater 
restrictions but also a new range of possibilities for resistance and creative 
openings for action (whether by States, individuals, non-governmental actors, or 
the international community at large) that were impossible to imagine under the 
classic, static view of the border? I believe the answer is affirmative and it need 
not fall back on the horns of the competing yet no longer stable poles of the static-
border and disappearing-border narratives.  
To overcome the current impasse, we need to return to the basics—to the 
conceptions of sovereignty, territory, and legal spatiality—which, like Arendt’s 
analysis, still rely heavily on the static conception of borders in which access to 
territory is the crucial component. 
C.     Closing the Accountability Gap 
We have already seen the manifold ways in which the shifting border 
disrupts traditional notions of sovereignty and territoriality. Instead of ignoring 
this reality (as is done by most accounts of migration, whether positive or 
normative), I wish to take the argument a step further and argue that it is more 
promising to borrow a page from the shifting border book, albeit subversively. 
The basic idea, currently more aspirational than applied, is to take advantage of 
the shifting border’s advanced techniques of spatial and temporal expansion in 
order to counter its stated goals of restriction. Thus, where a country intentionally 
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de-links migration control activities from its geographical borders, a correlated 
expansion of rights and protections for the individual must follow. Three inter-
related strategies would help to achieve this result: (i) expanding the 
extraterritorial reach of human rights, and (ii) placing the burden on destination 
states to deploy border representatives on intake missions to countries of origin 
and transit, effectively mobilizing the machinery of the shifting border in service 
of mobility and rights-protection; and (iii) rethinking legal spatiality to view it as 
a resource for rights-protection rather than a tool for exclusion. These three 
changes in law and thought would relax the outdated fixation on territorial access 
as a precondition for refuge and protection, a shift that is necessary if we are to 
respond to the reality of borders that move. All three components of this new 
approach warrant further elaboration. 
a. Human Rights Follow the Shifting Border 
The first method, expanding the extraterritorial reach of human rights, would 
function to reign in the shifting border by ensuring that core human rights and 
constitutional provisions that regulate and constrain the exercise of executive 
power would apply irrespective of the location where border control activities are 
exercised, whether on land, sea, or in the air. The goal is to act as if power 
exercised at the shifting border had been exercised within the domain of the 
territorial State or its actual, physical frontiers, activating the range of legal 
instruments and norms that constrain the state and its agents in the presence of 
exercising governmental authority.198 This does not mean that migration 
regulation would “resettle” at the fixed border. Rather, it may spell no less 
important a shift in enforcing restraint on such exercise of power, according to the 
basic constitutional principle that the “presence of authority does not entail the 
absence of constraint.”199 
Policymakers accept this restraining principle in most other fields of law.200 
Furthermore, there is no inherent reason why the sovereign authority to control 
borders ought to entail that the “government must have virtually unrestricted 
power over immigration—power largely immune from constitutional constraint, 
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judicial oversight and even moral objection.”201 From the perspective of the 
individual, bringing constitutional and human rights constraints to bear on the 
exercise of authority at the shifting border would entail that basic procedural and 
substantive protections that would have applied to the encounter with a border 
agent at the territorial edges of the country should analogously apply if equivalent 
movement-control authority is exercised in a remote location.202 This first line of 
response is based on the rationale underlying the shifting border, namely the call 
to switch from the merely territorial to the jurisdictional and the functional. This 
proposed framework rests on human rights arguments in favor of treating effective 
control as the relevant basis for legal responsibility in such extraterritorial or grey-
zone situations. 
There are important precedents pushing in this direction. In its recent case 
law, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) imposed juridical limits on 
extraterritorial migration control on the high sea. In the early 2000s, facing a tide 
of irregular migrants from Libya headed to the Italian coast, Italy began to 
conceptualize the space of the Mediterranean sea as an expanded “border zone” 
that could act as a buffer to mainland Italy.203 To achieve this vision, Italy and 
Libya signed the innocently named Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation, which stipulated a grandiose migration control project whereby Italy 
would provide ships and staff to patrol the 2,000 kilometers of Libyan coastline.204 
The treaty addressed neither the interdiction nor the push back of irregular 
migrants intercepted on the high seas, nor did it specify any human rights 
provisions or protections for asylum seekers. In the landmark Hirsi case, decided 
in 2012, the ECtHR held that Italy had breached its protection obligations when 
it stopped a vessel with about 200 passengers and sent the intercepted migrants 
back to Libya without providing them with a chance to make protection claims. 
To establish whether Italy had a protective responsibility, the ECtHR had to 
determine whether the group of irregular migrants who filed the claim (24 of the 
estimated 200 migrants who were onboard the interdicted boat) were at any stage 
under Italy’s jurisdiction. Although the European Convention of Human Rights 
does not apply globally, in Hirsi the Grand Chamber held that human rights 
 
201 Id., at 53. In practice, such regulation is hard to achieve even within the domestic sphere, let alone 
at the transnational level.  
202 The implementation of such an edict is of course highly complex as the border itself has frequently 
been a special region of potentially less extensive rights protections. As with other fields of law in 
which law applies extraterritorially, important procedural and substantive details need to be worked 
out, but the principle remains clear: the exercise of legal authority cannot be free from review and 
accountability by virtue of operating from a distance. 
203 Valentina Aronica, Italy, the Mediterranean as a Political Space, and Implications for Maritime 
Migration Governance (2016) (unpublished MSc dissertation, University of Oxford).  
204 The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation Between the Italian Republic and Great 
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Aug. 30,  2008, https://www.perfar.eu/policies/treaty-
friendship-partnership-and-cooperation-between-italian-republic-and-great-0 (specifically Articles 8, 
9, 19 and 20). See Natalino Ronzitti, The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between 
Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?, 1 BULLETIN OF ITALIAN 
POLITICS 125, 130 (2009) (commenting on the bilateral treaty). 
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obligations do not necessarily stop at the traditional, territoriality-fixed 
“Westphalian” border. Instead, such obligations can follow state action and thus 
become applicable beyond a state’s borders if and when state officials exercise 
“continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control.”205 By focusing on the 
exercise of effective control, rather than asking where the act took place, the 
ECtHR expanded Italy’s legal liability beyond its territorial border. Moreover, it 
held that Italy’s failure to offer the interdicted-at-sea migrants an opportunity to 
make an asylum claim or challenge their removal—procedures they would have 
been entitled to had they actually “made it” to Italy’s shores—amounted to a 
breach of the Convention. 
As evidenced in Hirsi, the ECtHR has rejected the rights-restricting approach 
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sale, in which the Court held that, under 
domestic or international law, the U.S. Coast Guard is not obliged to non-
refoulement if irregular migrants are interdicted on the high seas and then turned 
back. By contrast, the ECtHR adopted a more expansive interpretation of 
jurisdiction, responsibility, and effective control. We saw earlier that the ability 
to repeatedly change the locus of migration control and act through multiple levels 
of governance and with various actors, both public and private, gives the shifting 
border its edge. Refocusing on the content, not the location, of the shifting border 
techniques adopted by States—which are either acting alone, in concert, or under 
the auspices of supranational entities such as Frontex—helps close the 
accountability gap, extend rights, and apply regulatory controls on otherwise 
“unruly” practices.   
In another recent case, N.D. and N.T, which dealt with attempts by Spain to 
stop migrants from reaching the cities of Ceuta and Melilla (enclaves of Spain in 
Morocco), the ECtHR again emphasized that what matters is not how a member 
State defines its “operational border”, but whether those affected by such exercise 
of migration control were given basic procedural protections. Whereas the Hirsi 
case dealt with a policy of stretching the border outwards, N.D. and N.T concerns 
the tendency to pull the border inward, as we have seen in the U.S. example of 
expedited removal. Guarding against uninvited entry, Spain erected an 11.5-
kilometer barrier around Melilla by building three massive fences of barbed wire, 
fitted with sensors and cameras, and thus separating the European Union from 
Africa. The three fences were located on Spanish territory, not outside it. 
Reminiscent, too, of the Australian concept of excised territory, Spain carved out 
a zone of Spanish territory in Melilla that was “non-Spain” for the purposes 
migration control. In this so-called operational border zone, the principle of non-
refoulement did not apply.206   
 
205 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 81 (Feb. 23, 2012).  
206 Anyone caught trying to climb the fences, crossing the area between the fences, or sitting on top of 
the third fence closest to the city of Melilla, was subject to a practice of “summary returns” to Morocco. 
These summary returns applied to third-country nationals that were “detected on the border line of the 
territorial demarcation of Ceuta or Melilla while trying to cross the border’s contentive elements 
(fences) to irregularly cross the border.” Aliens Act art. 10 (B.O.E. 2009, 10) (Spain). 
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A human rights group represented N.D. and N.T., Malian and Ivorian 
nationals who were part of a group of migrants who attempted to enter Spain via 
the Melilla barrier, in a  challenge to Spain’s practice before the ECtHR.207 While 
there was some confusion about the precise chronology of the events at the 
enclosures, the basic facts were that N.D. and N.T. had succeeded in scaling the 
first two fences and had climbed on to the top of the third fence. After several 
hours, they had climbed down the third fence with the assistance of the Spanish 
police. Members of Spain’s Guardia Civil had immediately arrested them, and 
without affording them procedural treatment or opportunities to explain their 
identities and circumstances, had transferred them back to Morocco, where they 
were subsequently deported.208 By Spain’s account, N.D. and N.T.  were stopped 
at the operational border and thus never reached Spain. By extension, they never 
entered the region and “realm” of European human rights conventions and 
protections. The Strasburg court flatly rejected this claim. Interestingly, however, 
the ECtHR avoided a determination on whether the applicants succeeded in 
entering Spain, sidestepping a confrontation with a national Member State on a 
matter as sensitive as defining its own geographic and cartographic boundaries. 
Instead, it switched the jurisdictional basis altogether: from the territorial to the 
functional. The court held that once the applicants climbed down the third fence, 
they were under the “continuous and exclusive control of the Spanish 
authorities.”209 By virtue of this exercise of effective control by uniformed State 
officials, jurisdiction had arisen. 
These legal precedents offer a glimpse into how effective control—as a 
functional rather than territoriality-bounded interpretation of jurisdiction—can 
expand the spatial reach of human rights in ways that begin to mimic the creativity 
and flexibility of the shifting border itself. If governments seek the “gain” of 
excision and the creation and fortification of constitution-free or human-rights-
free zones, they cannot do so without constraints. The “pain” of judicial review 
and the strictures of separation of powers are the foundation of rule of law 
democracies. Without them, there is no check on executive power, no bulwark 
against arbitrary government. The extraterritorial application of constitutional and 
human rights protections is an indispensable mechanism to ensure that when a 
government acts “outside its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and 
unlimited.’”210 While still nascent and evolving, the jurisprudence is slowly 
catching up with the dynamic reinvention of territorially-unbounded border 
control.211 The basic idea of having legal responsibility “follow” the versatile 
 
207 N.D and N.T v. Spain, App. Nos. 8675/15, 8697/15, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008). 
211 In theory, we can imagine a legal regime establishing such responsibility wherever and whenever 
border migration controls take place. In practice, the case law to date is more circumscribed. It holds 
that when the facts clearly establish that border guards or other official agents of the State exercise 
effective control and explicitly breach a basic norm of human rights such as non-refoulement or fail 
to offer core procedural protections, legal responsibility will follow. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 
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actions and locations of migration control is one promising path to begin to close 
the gap between a mobile exercise of the shifting border and an outdated system 
of constraints on the exercise of authority that is imagined as immobile under the 
confines of a static vision of territoriality. 
No solution is a panacea, however. In the cat-and-mouse game that has 
governments extending the reach of the shifting border both inward and outward 
while seeking to skirt their constitutional and human rights responsibilities, these 
governments may again prove more adaptive and savvy than the disappearing 
border or demise-of-the-state globalization theories would predict. Post-Hirsi, 
Italy no longer sends its ships and personnel to interdict unwanted migrants in the 
high seas. Instead, with generous EU funding, it has trained Libyan coast guard 
officials to do Europe’s dirty job of closing the border.212 Such “outsourcing” of 
migration control to third countries makes it difficult to establish legal 
responsibility; the requisite jurisdictional link with an EU Member State is 
technically broken.213 The question of whether Italy has “proxy responsibility” 
under these circumstances is now the subject of litigation before the ECtHR. A 
coalition of human rights organizations commenced legal action against Italy on 
behalf of survivors of a sinking dingy carrying migrants off the coast of Libya.214 
The legal action alleges that the Italian authorities collaborated with Libyan Coast 
Guard to stop the migrants from reaching Europe by engaging in pull back 
operations. The core legal question at issue is whether the Italian authorities are 
flouting their human rights obligations by “outsourcing to Libya what they are 
prohibited from doing themselves.”215  
Additional concerns arise with the growing reliance on carrier sanctions. A 
series of bilateral and multilateral agreements oblige airline companies and other 
private for-profit actors to engage in what is essentially a quintessential act of 
 
27765/09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 23, 2012). See also Seunghwan Kim, Non-Refoulement and 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: State Sovereignty and Migration Controls at Sea in European Context, 




212 The reports from Libya that migrants from west Africa are bought and sold in a modern-day slave 
trade is only exacerbating these concerns of complicity and unspeakable abuse of human rights. 
African Migrants Reportedly Being Sold in ‘Slave Markets’ in Libya, UN Agency Warns, Réfugiés Et 
Migrants, (Apr. 11, 2017),   https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13105.doc.htm; 
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/fr/node/100043193. 
213 Such concerns were raised in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants 
by François Crépeau. See François Crépeau (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants), 
Regional study: management of the external borders of the European Union and its impact on the 
human rights of migrants ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/46 (Apr. 24, 2013). 
214 GLAN, Legal Action Against Italy Over Its Coordination of Libyan Coast Guard Pull-Back 
Resulting in Migrant Deaths and Abuse (May 18, 2018), http://www.glanlaw.org/single-
post/2018/05/08/Legal-action-against-Italy-over-its-coordination-of-Libyan-Coast-Guard-pull-
backs-resulting-in-migrant-deaths-and-abuse. 
215 Yale Law Sch., Lowenstein Clinic Supports Lawsuit on Migrants in the Mediterranean (May 8, 
2018), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/lowenstein-clinic-supports-lawsuit-migrants-
mediterranean (quoting Dr. Violeta Moreno-Lax, GLAN legal advisor). 
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public exercise of migration-control authority: pre-entry clearance.216 Frontline 
airline personnel or private security guards must check whether passengers have 
valid passports, visas, and any other required documentation prior to departure, 
operating as “surrogate border guards.”217 In many parts of the world, these 
private actors are “often assisted by immigration liaison officers or  officials from 
the destination state stationed in the departure State.”218 This arrangement requires 
the cooperation of third countries, which must authorize the deployment on their 
territories of these foreign immigration or liaison officers. Remarkably, while 
stationed aboard and jointly implementing measures of migration control, these 
immigration liaison officers maintain only an advisory role with regard to the 
controls carried out by the airline staff, thus limiting the possibility of attaching 
liability to their home countries. As these examples illustrate, the more layers of 
discretion there are, and the greater the number and variation of actors involved 
(public and private, at home and abroad, official and semi-official), the more 
difficult it is to attribute legal responsibility, even under the more expansive 
interpretation of effective control. 
b. Shifting the Burden From the Individual to the State 
If mobility is to be protected in the age of the shifting border, it is not enough 
for destination states merely to affirm the human rights of those under their 
effective control. Rather, these countries should play an affirmative role in 
facilitating mobility. A rights-affirming response to the shifting border implores 
domestic, regional, and international courts, governments and engaged publics to 
dig new channels for migrants seeking protection, rather than leaving these 
migrants to rely exclusively on the act of “touching base.”  
An example may help explain this second point. In 2015, Canada emerged 
as one of the global “good doers” in swiftly airlifting and resettling over 25,000 
Syrian refugees.219 How did Canada achieve this humanitarian feat? Unlike 
Europe, these refugees did not reach its shores. Instead, the border came to them, 
conceptually and functionally. The Canadian government dispatched Canadian 
immigration officials to refugee camps in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, where 
they conducted pre-screening interviews with and identity verification of asylum 
seekers.220 Within a matter of weeks, these reviews were completed, and Canada 
 
216 Gammeltoft-Hansen, Private Actor Involvement in Migration Management, supra note 91. 
217 MORENO-LAX, supra note 136, at 6. 
218 Theodore Baird, Carrier Sanctions in Europe: A Comparison of Trends in 10 Countries, 19 
EUROPEAN J. MIGRATION & LAW 307, 328 (2017).  
219    By 2017, the number of resettled Syrian refugees in Canada has almost doubled, reaching 
approximately 50,000, many of whom benefited from the country’s innovative private sponsorship 
resettlement program. GOV’T OF CANADA, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT ON IMMIGRATION 
(2017), https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-
manuals/annual-report-parliament-immigration-2017.html. 
220 Press Release, International Organization for Migration, IOM, Canada Open Processing Center in 
Amman, Jordan for Canada-bound Refugees (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-canada-
open-processing-center-amman-jordan-canada-bound-refugees; see also Gov’t of Canada, 
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issued not only temporary travel documents to its gates, but also permanent 
resident visas to successful claimants.221 This road to citizenship provided an 
alternative to years of insecurity and limbo waiting for determination of their 
status in Europe, which would have only been possible if they were among the 
lucky ones who managed to reach its shores and comply with the requirements of 
the territoriality of asylum in order to be given such a chance in the first place.  
Operating within a global paradigm of migration control, the Canadian 
initiative allowed the state to exercise powerful gatekeeping functions. However, 
it was revolutionary in deploying the shifting border “machinery” in the service 
of enhancing rights and securing mobility, rather than inhibiting both. This was 
done by shifting the burden of “touching base,” normally placed on asylum-
seekers, to States and their authorized agents, moving the determination process 
closer to the asylum seekers wherever they are, so as to provide access-from-afar 
to opportunities that are otherwise open only to those who can afford to reach the 
actual border. Much like Canada’s reliance on the long arm of the shifting border 
when restricting mobility, this initiative allows decisions to occur prior to arrival 
and many thousands of miles away from the actual border.222 Affording protection 
extraterritorially thus retains a statist logic, exerting sovereign control over 
admission and membership decisions,223  although it is more amenable to regional 
and international cooperation efforts.224 However, shifting the burden from the 
individual to the state here bolsters, rather than undermines, rights and protections 
for those who need them most. At the same time, for the individuals selected, it 
provides hope, dignity, and a ticket to a new, permanent home.225 By completing 
 
#WelcomeRefugees: How It Will Work (Nov. 28 2016), 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/overview.asp; Gov’t of Canada, #WelcomeRefugees 
to Canada (Nov. 24, 2015),  https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/news/2015/11/-welcomerefugees-to-canada.html. 
221 Gov’t of Canada, #WelcomeRefugees: Key figures, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-
refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/welcome-syrian-refugees/key-figures.html#popup1; see also 
Gov’t of Canada, Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative – Looking to the Future, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/welcome-syrian-
refugees/looking-future.html.  
222   Resettlement, voluntary repatriation, and local integration are the three durable solutions promoted 
by the UNHCR. Resettlement facilitates relocation from refugee camps in conflict zone, where the 
vast majority of the world’s displaced persons are presently hosted, to willing third countries that are 
typically far removed from the conflict zone. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (2011),  http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf. 
223    Pre-screening and admission from abroad also keeps the resettling government in the driver seat 
and allows it to combine international humanitarian assistance with a message of control 
communicated to the domestic population. As official documents put it: “protecting the safety, security 
and health of Canadians and refugees is a key factor guiding the Government of Canada’ actions 
throughout this initiative.” Compare this tone to the sense of loss of control and images of a mounting 
“invasion” manifested by leaders throughout Europe, and across the political spectrum, in the current 
refugee crisis. Needless to say, not all countries have the luxury of prescreening and resettlement. 
224 In the context of regional and global cooperation, countries would have to agree on how to allocate 
responsibilities among themselves for accepting refuges, according to what principles, and at what 
levels of absorption.   
225 Such resettlement determinations usually rely on UNHCR or country-specific priority criteria; they 
offer more immediate relief to those who are more vulnerable, according to priority criteria. In 
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the refugee determination and immigration screening process without demanding 
that asylum seekers first reach the territory of a state or its border, processing-at-
a-distance creates possibilities for claiming asylum from “distant” places. By 
allowing for an expansion of the spaces of protection, people escaping from 
harm’s way who are unable to comply with the territorial arrival dictum will gain 
a chance to secure international protection according to priority criteria. Given the 
ingenuity of the shifting border architects, “touching base” should always remain 
an open venue for claiming protection. Moreover, vigilance is required to ensure 
that states and their delegates do not use—or rather, abuse—resettlement and 
related measures of processing-at-a-distance as substitutes for asylum procedures 
activated by territorial arrival, or as an additional pretext for preventing such 
arrival in the first place.  
 None of this will be easy to achieve in the current political climate, but the 
point I wish to emphasize is conceptual rather than applied. Although structurally 
resembling the shifting border, the severance of the linkage between territory and 
exercise of migration control in this context is a rights-enhancing, rather than 
rights-restricting, legal innovation. Contrary to expectations, geographically far-
flung status-determination processing, complemented by the generous issuance of 
humanitarian visas that facilitate safe, dignified and legal entry channels for those 
facing exceptional circumstances provide greater control over who gets in and 
under what conditions, even in the context of an unfolding crisis, than the classic 
insistence on linking asylum claims to territorial access. The Canadian example 
thus shows us the potentially rights-enhancing possibilities buried underneath the 
restrictive tendencies of the shifting border.226 The inversion of roles tasks States 
with the responsibility to reach out to the individual in need of international 
 
responding to natural disasters, other programs have now been established, either bilaterally and 
multilaterally, in different regions, with the Stated goal of providing greater protection for migrants 
by establishing mechanisms to acquire visas in countries of origin or transit. United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, UNCHR Resettlement Handbook, supra note 222. In Brazil, for example, 
the government responded to a spike in human trafficking of Haitians seeking to escape the aftermath 
of the 2010 earthquake through a dangerous passage known as the “jungle route,” by opening in Port-
au-Prince, Haiti, a visa processing facility, in cooperation with the International Organization of 
Migration (IOM). FATAL JOURNEYS: IMPROVING DATA ON MISSING MIGRANTS, VOL. 3, PART 2, 89–
90 (Frank Laczko et al eds., 2007), http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/sps/news/2017/fatal-
journeys.pdf. The aim of this initiative is to allow potential migrants to apply for special humanitarian 
permanent visas on location, rather than rely on smugglers to get them to Brazil without authorization 
via the deadly jungle route. The initial screening and processing in Port-au-Prince is conducted by the 
IOM and the ultimate visa decisions are made by Brazilian officials, offering another example of how 
a “humanitarian” shifting border that comes to the individual where and when she is in dire need may 
offer safety and security without requiring territorial arrival as a precondition. As with any such 
initiative, the intentions of the acting governments and related parties must be carefully scrutinized 
and kept in check.   
226 Current recommendations, developed in the context of discussion surrounding the global compact 
on refugees, have called the global community to commit to the goal of resettling ten percent of the 
world’s refugees per year. For a concise overview, see Kevin Appelby, Strengthening the Global 
Refugee Protection System: Recommendations for the Global Compact on Refugees, 5 J. MIGRATION 
& HUMAN SECURITY 780 (2017).  
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protection, and does not, as current law dictates, put the onus on them to reach the 
territory of a protection-granting state.  
c. Legal Spatiality as a Resource  
So, while Arendt is correct that political organization is at the heart of the 
predicament we face, I want to suggest that a productive response will reverse the 
order of operations; scholars and activist might think about place and space as part 
of the solution and then muster the political organization to follow.227 More 
importantly still, treating space as a resource, not a problem, can help avert the 
plight that Arendt so powerfully identified of not having a place, any place, in the 
world in which the rightless, the stateless, or the displaced, can find refuge. Legal 
reliance on static, old-school, sovereigntist conceptions of “space” for relief and 
refuge prevents access to new worlds of opportunity for those who need them 
most. It condemns many of them to the Sisyphean fate of traversing and re-
traversing terrains of shifting borders, at risk of being sent back to the country of 
origin or transit at any point along the continuum of checkpoints and legal portals 
that constitute today’s migration control apparatus.  
Moving the border closer to the individual to offer her protection may take 
various configurations. It can be the result of unilateral decision-making, as in the 
Canadian initiative, or a result of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Either 
way, the discretion of a downstream country of resettlement to act outside its 
border is conditional upon the consent of the upstream, refugee-hosting country 
to hold the interviews and screening procedures on the latter’s territory.228 Here 
we witness both the de-territorialization of legal space, as the process can, in 
principle, take place anywhere in the world, and its re-territorialization, as the 
interview must take place somewhere on the face of the earth. More 
comprehensive relief efforts would harness significant cooperation across 
national and regional borders, but so too will any feasible solution.229 In terms of 
policy-making, such programs will likely embrace burden- and responsibility-
sharing initiatives, in line with the recent UN Global Compact 
recommendations.230 Future endeavors to break the exclusivity of the “touching 
 
227 Governments themselves now routinely amend and challenge fixed conceptions of territoriality, for 
example, by creating special economic zones within their jurisdictions whereby distinctive legal 
regimes apply, or by the creation of jointly-governed border regions, in which cooperative governance 
is influenced by more than one set of legal norms emanating from multiple and multilevel sources.  
228 Where relevant, the cooperation of the UNHCR is also elicited. The condition of consent by the 
country of asylum where migrants and refugees reside is vital. Otherwise, the humanitarian variant of 
the shifting border might be abused by States seeking to aggrandize their power in the name of 
protecting the vulnerable.   
229     The goal is to undo or at least tame the current linkage between arbitrary geographical proximity 
and bearing the brunt of humanity’s dispossessed. 
230 In the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the world’s leaders emphasized “the 
centrality of international cooperation” and further committed “to a more equitable sharing of the 
burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while taking account of 
existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among [s]tates.” See G.A. Res. 71/1, 
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, ¶¶ 7, 11 (Sept. 19, 2016). While no concrete 
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base” dicta will require daring political leadership that is currently in short supply; 
however, counter to populist and anti-immigrant rhetoric, it is in the sovereigntist 
interest of States to create a comprehensive action plan that will allow refugees to 
apply from afar, as well as to keep open routes for protection that are activated 
upon territorial arrival. 
Observing the dangers of inaction by Europe prior to the refugee crisis of 
2015, François Crépeau, the United Nation Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants, proposed at the time that EU member States, along with other 
Global North countries, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
States, as well as a number of immigration countries in the South, such as Brazil, 
make a commitment to a meaningful refugee resettlement program that States 
could put into operation with the help of the UNHCR and civil society 
organizations according to priority criteria.231 Such a proposal was never adopted. 
However, its principled and prudential justification rests precisely on the logic 
that I have advanced here—namely, extending protection through relocation or 
resettlement to a wider class of people fleeing oppression and involving more non-
geographically-proximate countries in the effort of relief. Such programs reach 
out to “people out of place” in the countries to which they have fled. In this way, 
they encompass those who have not been able to comply with the survival-of-the-
fittest “ordinance” demanding that they enter the territory of the affluent countries 
that simultaneously do everything within their powers to keep them out. 
In a world where eighty-five percent of the global population of refugees and 
displaced persons are hosted by already struggling, resource-strapped countries in 
close proximity to active conflict zones, there is much to gain in breaking the 
current gridlock.232 Typically, when affluent States flex their legal muscles, the 
shifting border moves to avert uninvited entry. However, the very same 
techniques of reaching people before they encounter the territorial border, 
techniques that are currently rights-restricting, can also become rights-enhancing. 
Individuals in need of protection should be able to claim asylum or other forms of 
protection upon encountering the shifting border, which, given the logic of 
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146 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:1 
pushing the border out, will likely occur far away from the territory they wish to 
enter.  
It is important to note that the three-pronged strategy I have just described 
rests on the lexical priority of the first prong (human rights follow the border) over 
the latter two (both which aim at relocating protection operations to where 
vulnerable migrants are, rather than vice versa). The imperative of human rights 
protection at the border must take precedence to ensure that governmental 
authorities do not use outreach programs as fig leaves while extending the rights-
restricting power of the shifting border under humanitarian guises.   
CONCLUSION 
The shifting border is one of the most dramatic developments currently 
unfolding in the world of migration and mobility control, yet it has received only 
scant attention. Today’s brusque encounters of moving bodies and shifting 
borders provide concrete illustrations to broader and more fundamental tensions 
in law and ethics, such as those between sovereignty and human rights, local and 
global obligations, the right of the state to exclude and its duty to protect. Instead 
of rehearsing these influential debates, this Article has sought to disrupt some of 
these familiar dichotomies while simultaneously investigating the grounds on 
which they stand.  
A new approach is required to decipher the emerging code of the shifting 
border in a world in which prosperous “islands” of high standards of human rights, 
affluence and democratic governance are increasingly protected through the 
repressive machinery of the shifting border and “de-territorialized” migration 
control. The sheer reach and magnitude of the shifting border also calls for 
revisiting the age-old question of how to tame menacing governmental authority. 
As this power is almost boundless in its conceptual framing and spatial 
manifestation, it has become increasingly difficult to challenge with traditional 
legal tools and conceptions of human rights, both of which still remain territorially 
centered.  
 The analysis I have offered—especially the emphasis on territory’s 
malleability under the shifting border conception, now routinely and 
instrumentally used to help States control migration and admit the few but not the 
many—points to a previously unexplored path. Instead of a menacing obstacle 
and tool to restrict access to asylum, we can rethink the shifting border as a 
creative resource in the service of advancing human rights across borders. As we 
have seen, the shifting border is a powerful tool and States are unlikely to cede 
their authority over migration regulation any time soon, especially not in the 
current political environment.  
 Under such circumstances, the changes to policy and legal thinking that I 
have proposed offer a more promising future than the current alternatives on offer. 
The objective is to protect migrants’ procedural and substantive rights wherever 
they encounter the border while simultaneously relaxing the linkage between 
territory and asylum. It would lay the foundation for a conceptual and paradigm 
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shift that is long overdue. The better we comprehend the new logic and codebook 
informing the shifting border’s legal remit and its multifaceted policy instruments, 
the better positioned we will be to develop counter narratives and to carve out new 
theoretical and applied pathways to counter their deleterious effects.  
